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Schonfeld: Malicious Prosecution

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT:
CONTINUED CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY
EstherM. Schonfeld*
INTRODUCTION

Large numbers of plaintiffs who sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983'
allege that they were subject to malicious prosecution.

Because

Section 1983 provides a claim for relief only for violations of
federally protected rights, and not for state law wrongs, courts
must determine whether the malicious prosecution claim states a
violation of federal constitutional rights. Despite the great
frequency with which the issue arises, there is a tremendous
amount of uncertainty, inconsistency and confusion in the
decisional law.
The essential issue is whether the malicious prosecution claim
states a violation of either Fourth Amendment, substantive or
* J.D. Candidate 1999, Touro Law School; B.B.A. 1981, City University of
New York, Bernard M. Baruch College. The author would like to thank
Professor Martin Schwartz for inspiring me to write this article and for his
invaluable advice and assistance throughout the development of this article.
The author would also like to express her gratitude to Charles Baron, Esq. and
Michele Le Moal-Gray for their helpful comments. This article is dedicated to
Jeremy and Alexandra, whose love, patience and support have made this work
possible.
'42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit at equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. See generally 1A, 1B & 1C MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRmKN,
SECrION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (3d ed. 1997). See also
SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIvIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION THE LAW
OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 1998).
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procedural due process rights.2 In Albright v. Oliver,3 the United
States Supreme Court endeavored to resolve the conflict in the

lower courts regarding whether malicious prosecution constitutes
a constitutional tort actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4 Chief
Justice Rehnquist characterized this issue as one "on which there
is an embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion." 5 Nevertheless,
in Albright, the Court had no more success in arriving at a
resolution than did the lower courts. 6 The Court's decision was
2

In recent years the Supreme Court has been less willing to increase the

scope of non-textual due process rights. See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992). In Collins, the Supreme Court noted that "the
Court has been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process
because [the] guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered
area are scarce and open ended. The doctrine of judicial self restraint requires
us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in
this field." Id. at 125. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
(holding that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive
force... in the course of an arrest... should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than a 'Substantive Due
Process' approach"); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that
"there should be ...great resistance to expand[ing] the substantive reach
of ...[the Due Process Clause], particularly if it requires redefining the
category of rights deemed to be fundamental."). See also Daniel 0. Conkle,
The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215 (1987)
(speculating that the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick represented the
beginning of the "second death of substantive due process."). In his article,
Professor Conlde states that substantive due process met its first death in the
1930's when "the Court eliminated substantive due process as a serious ground
of constitutional challenge" but "resurrected [it] again in Griswold v.
Connecticut." Id. at 218. The issue of whether an individual has a substantive
due process right to be free from prosecution without probable cause had
created much confusion among the lower courts. See, e.g., Brummet v.
Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1991); Morales v. Ramirez, 906 F.2d
784 (1st Cir. 1990); Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1988); Coogan v.
Wixon, 820 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1987); Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556
(9th Cir. 1987); Singleton v. City of New York., 632 F2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980).
3 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
4 Id. at 269-72.
5 975 F.2d at 345 (citing Brummet v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1180, n.2 (5th
Cir. 1991)).
6 Martin A. Schwartz, The § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Case, N.Y. L.J.,
March 15, 1994, at 3. According to Professor Schwartz, "[tihis highly

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss4/26

2

Schonfeld: Malicious Prosecution

1999

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

1683

an opinion encompassing six different views. 7 Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion, and was joined by Justices

O'Connor, Scalia and Ginsburg." Ultimately, the plurality agreed
that a substantive due process violation cannot occur when a
criminal prosecution is initiated without probable cause.9
According to the Court, the Fourth Amendment,"° not substantive
due process, is the source for evaluating constitutional claims
similar to those inAlbright.1"
The inability of the Aibrigh court to reach a consensus has
perpetuated the confusion in the lower courts. 2 As one recent
court noted, "there has been a remarkable divergence of opinion

among the circuit courts."" The lower courts, post-Albright,
continue to grapple with the issue of whether a claim of malicious
prosecution can be asserted under Section 1983.4 Therefore, the
availability of Section 1983 for relief on a malicious prosecution
claim remains unclear.' 5 Some lower courts continue to adhere to
pre-Albright analysis. Other lower court decisions, however,
fragmented decision does a great disservice to the public. It will undoubtedly
spur much litigation, because technically the various opinions fail to definitely
resolve the Fourth Amendment and due process issues." Id.
7 Albright, 510 U.S. at 267. See Schwartz, supra note 6.
8
Albright, 510 U.S. at 267. Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Kennedy, joined
by Justice Thomas and Justice Souter, filed concurring opinions. Id. Justices
Stevens and Blackman filed dissenting opinions. Id.
' Id. at 273-274. The plurality concluded that "it is evident that substantive
due process may not furnish the constitutional peg on which to hang such a
'tort.'" Id. at 271 n.4.
'0 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or the things to be seized.
Id.
" Albright, 510 U.S. at 274.
12 See infra part V.
3
UBOH v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000 (1998).
14See infra part IV.
" See generally 1A, 1B & 1C MARTIN A. SCHwARTZ & JOHN E.
SEcrION 1983: CLAIMs AND DEFENsEs (3d ed. 1997).
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demonstrate that Albright may be influencing the courts to view
more narrowly Section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution.
This article will examine the constitutional ramifications of the
Supreme Court's decision in Albright v. Oliver. The purpose of
this article is to provide a comprehensive analysis as to whether
malicious prosecution is actionable under Section 1983. Parts I
and II of this article will address the availability of Section 1983
to remedy constitutional violations and the specific development
of malicious prosecution as a constitutional tort. 16 Part Il
discusses the lower federal court treatment of malicious
prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Albright.17 Part IV examines and analyzes the
different opinions of the Supreme Court in Albright' 8 Part V
explores the treatment by the lower federal courts of malicious
prosecution cases brought pursuant to Section 1983 subsequent to
Albright.'9 Finally, Part VI presents an analysis of the Supreme
Court's decision and argues that malicious prosecution claims
may be actionable under Section 1983 if the plaintiff alleges a
constitutional violation protected by the Fourth Amendment.2"
I.

SECTION

1983

As

A

TOOL

FOR

REMEDYING

CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS

A. Section 1983: Its HistoricalRoots
"No federal statute is more important in contemporary American
" 21
law than 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 grew out of the period of the Civil War and
Reconstruction when antebellum assumptions about the nature of
See infra notes 21-145 and accompanying text.
infra notes 146-200 and accompanying text
18 See infra notes 201-309 and accompanying text
19 See infra notes 310-500 and accompanying text
16

17 See

21

See infra notes 501-544 and accompanying text
See Schwartz, supra note 15, at § 1.1. For an overview of legal

commentary on Section 1983 see also SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS &
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 1998).
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federal system were superceded by an emphasis on national
power.' 2 Prior to the Civil War, the Constitution of the United
States protected fundamental rights only against infringement by
the federal government.'
The first ten amendments failed to
provide ample protection from acts of individuals or state
governments. The post-War Reconstruction period "marked a
fundamental shift in the federal government's role in protecting
African-Americans'
newly-won rights of freedom and
citizenship."' Before the Civil War, the federal government was
unable to interfere with the judgments of localities and states as to
what legal rights African-Americans enjoyed.2 As a result,
throughout the United States, African-Americans were treated as
a subordinate class of beings, and state and local laws withheld
from them the most fundamental freedoms.'
In the aftermath of the war, however, dramatic changes were to
take place and Congress was ready

for a constitutional

7

revolution. The end of slavery was near, yet a new controversy
had emerged over the "federalist or nationalist tendencies of the
abolitionists as they moved to consolidate their victory."' The
result of this controversy was the adoption of Reconstruction
Amendments,29 the first of which was the Thirteenth Amendment
of the Constitution, adopted in 1866.30
The Thirteenth Amendment was viewed as an abolishment of
slavery and a constitutional basis for the protection of certain
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
See Douglas L. Colbert, Bfurcation of Civil Rights Defendants:
Undennining Monell In Police Brutality Cases 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499 (1993)
(discussing in detail the historical imperative behind Section 1983).
22
2

2Id.

2

at 510.

id.

2 Id.

' See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 MICH L REv. 1323 (1952).
2

id.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XLV, XV.
U.S. CONST. amend. XII, § 1. The Thirteenth Amendment provides:
[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist with the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." Id.
2

30
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guaranteed minimum rights. 3

Nonetheless,

[Vol 15
the need for

"legislative appendages to the Thirteenth Amendment became
almost immediately apparent. "32 The violent resistance in the
South to the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment "provided
Congress with the legal impetus and moral determination to

introduce further legislation for the purpose of giving 'practical
effect, life, vigor, and enforcement'

to the Amendment's

'declara[tion] that all persons in the United States should be
free.' 33 When the Thirty-ninth Congress convened in 1865, it
passed, over President Andrew Johnson's veto, the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. 34

The Civil Rights Act of 1866, which marked the beginning of
the new federalism, was aimed at granting citizenship to all

individuals born in the United States.35 Upon the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, all citizens, without regard to color,
were entitled to equal protection of the laws.36 After the passage
of this law, civil rights activists wished to make permanent the
centralization of civil rights authority in federal government.37

The Fourteenth Amendment resulted from the implementation of
31See

Gressman, supra note 27 at 1324.

32 See

id.

33 See

Colbert, supra note 23, at 499 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 474 (1866) (remarks of Senator Trumbull)).
' Id. See The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 37 (1866).
Section one
provides in pertinent part:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude ...shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory in the United States to make and enforce contract
rights, to sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to
full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property, as enjoyed by white citizens....
Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted pursuant to the Thirteenth
Amendment. Portions of this legislation are now codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1891-1982 (1994).
3S See Gressman, supra note 27, at 1329.
36 see id.
37 see id.
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this activist viewpoint.3 Within a year after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress thought it necessary to
eliminate barriers to blacks' full enjoyment of their freedom,
inter alia, their right to vote.

Two years later, the Fifteenth

Amendment was ratified so as to protect the emancipated slaves'
39
right to vote.

However, the impact from the Civil War had generated a

"condition of affairs... rendering life and property insecure and
the carrying of mails and the collection of the revenue
dangerous." 4° The Reconstruction Amendments alone could not

put a stop to the widespread abuses in the South against the newly
freed slaves and their white supporters. There was a "campaign
of violence and deception in the South, fomented by the Ku Klux
Klan... denying decent citizens their civil and political

rights."4 1

This problem was augmented by state officials who

§ 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of the law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

38 U.S. CONST. amend. XV

Id.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 1. The Fifteenth Amendment states: "[t]he
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." Id.
40 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871). See also Amon D.
Siegel, Note, Section 1983 Remedies For The Violation of Supremacy Clause
Rights, 97 YALE L. 1827, 1831 (1988).
41 Schwartz, supra note 15, § 1.3 at 9 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 276 (1985)). See also CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1871).
Representative Beatty remarked:
[C]ertain States have denied to persons with their jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. The proof on this point is voluminous
and unquestionable... [Mien were murdered, houses were burned,
woman were outraged, men were scourged, and officers of the law
shot down; and the State made no successful effort to bring the
guilty to punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged
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themselves participated in the violence and failed to punish the

perpetrators.4 2 Among other things, victims of the violence were
faced with significant barriers in bringing their complaints to
federal court.

By 1871, the problem became so acute that President Grant sent
a message to Congress "recommend[ing] such legislation as in the

judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and
property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United
States." 43 It soon became clear to Congress that specific

legislation was necessary in order to combat the anti-black
atrocities that were being committed in the South by the Ku Klux

Klan. 44 The Forty-second Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, 45 now codified in 42 U.S.C. §1983, in response to what
and innocent.
The State, from lack of power or inclination,
practically denied the equal protection of the law to those persons.
Id.
42 See David Y. Bannard,

A Foreseeability-Based Standard For The
Determination of Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 28 B.C. L. REV.
937 (1987). Representative Perry remarked:
Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear,
hear not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit
juries act as if they might be accomplices. In the presence of these
gangs all the apparatus and machinery of civil government, all the
processes of justice, skulk away as if government and justice were
crimes and feared detection. Among the most dangerous things an
injured party can do is to appeal to justice. Of the uncounted scores
and hundreds of atrocious mutilations and murders it is credibly
stated that not one has been punished.
Id. at 979, n.34 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. at 428 (1871)).
43 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871).
44 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 441-51, 605-07 (1871) (reporting
the outrages by the Ku Klux Klan). See Bannard, supra note 42, at 941. "The
President's message was not, however, the only indication of the severity and
extent of this problem. The Senate also had received a 600 page report that
detailed both Klan activities and the inability or unwillingness of some state
governments to protect their citizens equally from the Klan depravities." Id.
41 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to
be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
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Congress perceived as the inability and unwillingness of the states
to enforce their laws equally.'" - "The Civil War had been fought
over more than just racial equality-it had been a war over the
soul of the Constitution. Section 1983 was meant to further the
winners' constitutional vision." 47
B. The Development of Section 1983 Into An Integral Part of
American Law
The Supreme Court's initial narrow statutory interpretations

s

caused Section 1983 essentially to be unused for almost ninety
years. 49
From 1871-1961, Section 1983 "lay virtually
dormant."," In those years, the Supreme Court interpreted
by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary
notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such
proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district courts of the
United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review
upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such
courts, under the provisions of the act of ninth of April, eighteen
hundred and sixty-six, entitled 'An act to protect all persons in the
United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their
vindication.' and the other remedial laws of the United States which
are in their nature applicable in such other cases.
Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, also referred to as the "Ku Klux Klan Act,"
was enacted for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
4

See Schwartz, supra note 15, §1.3 at 9. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365

U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961).
47 Arnon D. Seigel, Section 1983 Remedies For the Violation of Supremacy
Clause Rights, 97 YALE L.J. 1827, 1832 (1988) (citations omitted).
4 See, e.g., Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237, 240 (7th Cir. 1959) (holding that
acts in violation of state law fall outside Section 1983); Hemsley v. Myers, 45
F. 283, 290 (C.C.D. Ken. 1891) (holding "no new mode of proceeding is
enacted, and no new right created by [section 1983]. As now it stands... it
may be properly denominated a 'declaratory' statute."). See also Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939).
49
See Gressman, supra note 27, at 1342-43.
"0See P. Low & J.JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw OF FEDERALSTATE RELATIONS 891-95 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing that civil rights statutes
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"'under the color of law' to limit the statute's impact on
federalism."s 1
In the Slaughter-House cases,52 the Court
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and
immunities clause to include only those rights it deemed inherent

in federal citizenship.53 As a result, State-created privileges and
immunities were not fundamental federal rights protected by the

clause.54 Several years later, in the Civil Rights cases,55 the
Court underscored the requirement of state action as a
prerequisite for invoking the protection of the amendment. As
the Slaughter-House and Civil Rights cases demonstrate, the
Court's narrow view of Section 1983 prevented its use as a

remedy for violation of constitutional rights. As a result,
relatively few cases were brought under Section 1983 in the
ninety years after its enactment.56

The modem impetus for the development of Section 1983 did
not occur until 1961, when the Supreme Court unveiled the
groundwork for a broad application of the remedies provided in
Section 1983 for constitutional violations.57 In Monroe v. Pape,
"lay dormant" until "rediscovered and reinvigorated" in the modem era). See
also Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1487 (1969) (noting that only 19 decisions were
rendered under § 1983 in its first sixty-five years of existence).
"IMichael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns
and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539,
549 (1989).
52 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
5' Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 74-75.
5' 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
56 See Note, supra note 50, at 1487.
57 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Monroe involved a Fourth
Amendment claim of illegal search and seizure. Id. at 169. In Monroe,
thirteen police officers entered James Monroe's home early one morning
without a search warrant and ransacked the house, while the occupants were
forced to stand naked. Id. at 169-70. James Monroe was subsequently taken
to the police station, held in custody for ten hours, and interrogated about a
two-day old murder. ld. Monroe was never charged. Id. Thereafter, the
Monroes brought a § 1983 claim against the police officer and the City of
Chicago. Id. The Supreme Court held that there was a cause of action for
damages against the police officers. Id. at 192. The Court, however,
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the Supreme Court began a revival of Section 1983, by
recognizing the broad scope of its protection." Prior to Monroe,
one of the primary reasons that Section 1983 was ignored was an
early decision which had held that conduct by state and local
officials that was unauthorized by state law, was neither an act
"under color of law" nor state action. 9 Therefore, the Court's
"under color of law" ruling required a litigant to establish that the
state had authorized an official's unlawful conduct under state
law, state custom, or state usage. 60 The Court in Monroe

removed this restriction and rejected the narrow definition of the
term "under color of law" that had rendered Section 1983
ineffective for the previous ninety years."' Monroe construed the
term "under color of law" as encompassing unauthorized acts
committed by state officers, holding that when a state officer's
acts violate state law they were to be considered "under color of
law" for purposes of Section 1983 as long as the officer invoked

state authority.62 In addition, the Monroe court established that
the existence of a state remedy did not preclude the federal
dismissed the suit against the City because if found that Congress did not
intend to make a municipality a "person" under § 1983. Id. at 187. But see
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Seventeen
years after the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe limiting the liability of a
municipality, the Court in Monell came to the opposite conclusion and held
that a municipality could be classified as a "person" under § 1983. Id. at 690.
The Court surveyed the legislative record detailed in Monroe stating "[o]ur
analysis of the legislative history... compels the conclusion[s] that Congress
did intend municipalities... to be included among those persons to whom
§ 1983 applies." Id. at 690.
s Monroe, 365 U.S. at 198.
59
See, e.g., Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904) (holding that
City of New York's construction of a railroad tunnel did not qualify as state
action
because it was illegal and unauthorized).
60
See id.
6!Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187. Justice Frankfurter argued instead for a limited
construction of "under color of law" that would include only acts that were
actually authorized by state law or custom or for which the state refused to
provide a remedy. Id. at 242-43, 246 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
6. Id. The Court held that § 1983 covered acts by all those "who carry a
badge of authority of a state and represent it in some capacity, whether they
act in accordance with their authority or misuse it." Id. at 172.
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Section 1983 claim. 63 As a result of this decision, Section 1983

would become the principal means by which plaintiffs could hold
government officials accountable for the deprivation of
constitutional rights.64 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
stated that Section 1983 "should be read against the background
of tort liability that makes 6a5 man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions."
Since the Monroe decision, the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts have explored many different issues arising from
Section 1983 litigation. "As the climate in the federal courts
became more favorable, the evolutionary process gained
momentum., 66 The number of Section 1983 claims brought in
federal court increased so dramatically67 that by the 1970's the

Supreme Court began to restrict the scope of the constitutional
tort.68 For example, in Paul v. Dais,69 the Supreme Court
attempted to curtail the use of the Due Process Cause as a tool for
bringing common law tort actions under Section 1983. In Paul,
6 Id. at 183.
"It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced
would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy,
and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is
invoked." Id.
6 See Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved. Beyond the "Unhappy
History" Theory of Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 BYU. L. REv. 737 (exploring
the prevailing descriptions of the impact of the Monroe decision and
concluding that its operative feature was that it took the "Bill of Rights, then in
the process of 'incorporation' into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and showed how to ground civil rights litigation into it.").
6 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
6Susanah M. Mead, Evolution of the 'Species of Tort Liability' Created by
42 U.S.C. § 1983: Can Constitutional Tort Be Saved From Extinction?, 55
FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 22 (1986) (describing the concern over the increase in
the number of section 1983 cases filed as leading to a "period of devolution of
the constitutional tort species.").
Id. In 1960, 280 cases were filed under Section 1983, in 1970, 3,586
cases were filed under Section 1983 and, in 1971, 4,609 Section 1983 cases
were filed. Id. at n.42 (citations omitted).
68 See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651 (1977).
69 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Cf Wisconsin v. Constantinue, 400
U.S. 433 (1971).
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the Court held that injury to reputation caused by state officials is
not a deprivation of liberty or property protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment absent a demonstrable statutory
entitlement or loss of a state-conferred status.7" The plaintiff,
Davis, was pictured in a police department flyer labeled "active
shoplifters" that was sent to local business establishments in
Louisville, Kentucky. 7' Davis had been arrested for shoplifting,
however, soon after the flyer's circulation the charges against
him were dropped.' Davis chose not to pursue the available state
tort remedies, but instead brought suit in federal court under
Section 1983. 73 Davis claimed that he was branded a criminal
without the benefit of a trial, depriving him of his reputation, and
thereby depriving him of "liberty " or "property without due
process of law." 74 The Court disagreed holding that the "interest
in reputation asserted in this case is neither 'liberty nor 'property'
guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of
law." 7' Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, observed that
Davis' complaint "would appear to state a classical claim for
76
defamation actionable in the courts of virtually every state."
The Court was unwilling to convert traditional state tort law into
a claim of a deprivation of federal rights. 77
The court attempted to further restrict the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Ingraham v. Wright.7 Ingraham, a
Section 1983 case, involved a Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process claim challenging the use of corporal punishment in
public schools. 79 The plaintiffs, junior high school students who

were severely paddled by public school officials for alleged
disciplinary violations, argued that they were denied liberty
'oId. at 710-12.
71Id. at 701-02.
72 Id. at 695-96.
7 Id.

74
75

76

Id. at 698.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 697.

7'Id. at 698-99.

430 U.S. 651 (1977).
7Id. at 653.
78
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interests without due process."0 The Supreme Court held that

where a student who had been subjected to corporal punishment
could bring a state tort action for damages, no additional federal
remedy was required.81 The Court in Ingraham conceded that
students had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
freedom from unwarranted invasions of their bodily security,8"
but found that the availability of state remedies satisfied the due

process requirement.83
84
This principle was taken a step further in Parratt v. Taylor.
In Parratt,the Court found that the loss of a hobby kit was a

deprivation of a protected property interest, but that state
remedies

available to plaintiff provided the required

due

5

process. Parrattinvolved an inmate at a Nebraska prison who
brought a Section 1983 claim alleging that prison officials had
negligently lost mail-order hobby material valued at $23.50.86

The Court needed to determine "what process is due a person
when an employee of a state negligently takes his property." 87
The Parrattcourt held that the prison inmate was not entitled to a

pre-deprivation hearing to determine the propriety of his loss of
the hobby kit, because the available state tort remedies were
o Id. In 1970, Dade County schools were permitted to use corporal
punishment to maintain discipline pursuant to a local school board regulation
and Florida legislation. Id. at 655. However, the regulations contained
explicit limitations and directions. Id. at 656. The legislation required
consultation with the principal and authorized corporal punishment only when
other means of discipline were unsuccessful. Id. at 657. The evidence
demonstrated that the methods used in this case were exceptionally harsh. Id.
Ingraham was so severely paddled that he suffered a hematoma. Id.
SI Id. at 677.
Id. at 674 (stating "[ilt is fundamental that the state cannot hold and
physically punish an individual except in accordance with due process of
law.").
3Id. at 682-83.
84 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
5
Id. at 541.
8
6 Id. at 529.
" Id. at 537. But see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1985)
(holding that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is "simply
not implicated by a negligent act of [a state official] causing unintended loss
of, or injury to, life, liberty or property.").
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sufficient."8
The Court concluded that the post-deprivation
remedy was all the process that was due. 89
These three decisions demonstrate how the Court has attempted
to limit Section 1983 access to the federal courts by narrowing
Fourteenth Amendment protections and promoting the availability
of adequate state tort remedies as a satisfactory alternative. For
thirty years since the decision in Monroe, the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts continued to struggle with the political
and doctrinal consequences of the resurrection of Section 1983.
Nevertheless, in the years that followed the Monroe decision,
there has been an unprecedented growth in the number of cases
filed under section 1983.9" Professor Martin Schwartz largely
attributes the increase in the utilization of Section 1983 to four
major legal developments.91 First, the Monroe decision which

established that Section 1983 is "independent" and
"supplementary to" any available state law remedies.' Second,
the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social

Services,93 which overruled Monroe's finding that Congress did
The
not intend to include municipalities in Section 1983.'
Monell Court held that Congress did, in fact, intend local
88 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541. The Court held that the deprivation of the
prisoner's property by state prison officials did not violate the due process
clause because Nebraska tort claims procedures provided a "full and
meaningful opportunity" for the prisoner to seek compensation for the
negligence by the state prison officials. Id.
' Id. at 539. The Court reasoned that the government entity had no notice
that the deprivation would occur and thus could not conduct a hearing prior to
the deprivation. Id. at 541. The first available opportunity for the government
to provide a hearing was after the deprivation occurred. Id.
o See Schwartz, supra note 15, §1.1 at 3. "While only 270 federal civil
rights actions were filed in 1961, today between 40,000 and 50,000 § 1983
actions are commenced in federal court each year." Id.
9'Id. at 4.
' Id. (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)).
93 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, the Court considered whether plaintiffs
could obtain damages from both the City of New York and the Department of
Social Services based on the municipality's "official policy" of compelling
pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence even though the
employees were not medically required to do so. Id. at 661.
' See Schwartz, supranote 15, §1.1 at 5.
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governments to be treated as "persons" within the statute's
coverage.95 However, municipalities could only be held liable

when their "policies" or "customs"

caused constitutional

97
Two years later in Owen v. Oty of Independence,
violations.
the Court held that municipalities cannot assert qualified
immunity based upon the "good faith" of their employees. 9
96

The third development was the Supreme Court's decision in
Maine v. Thiboutot,9 9 which held that the remedy afforded under
9S Moneil,

436 U.S. at 690.

The Court found that "Congress in

enacting ...[Section 1983], intended to give a broad remedy for violations of
federally protected civil rights." Id. at 685.
96 Id. at 694. The Court stated "municipalities can be sued directly under
§ 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where.., the action
that is alleging to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at 690. The Court further stated
that when the "execution of a government policy or custom ... inflicts the
injury ...the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Id. at
694.
9'445 U.S. 662 (1980). The Court addressed the question unanswered by
Monell; whether municipalities are entitled to use the defense of official
immunity when litigating § 1983 cases. Id. at 624. In Owen, the City of
Independence's Chief of Police brought a § 1983 action alleging that his
dismissal, without notice and opportunity to be heard, violated his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights. Id. at 625, 629-30. The City Manager fired
the Chief of Police after the City Council voted to release various reports of
his alleged misfeasance to the news media. Id. at 627-29. The Court held that
the municipality was liable and not entitled to immunity from liability because
its agents acted in "good faith." Id. at 634, 638.
98Id. at 638. The Court analyzed the strong policy rationales for ensuring
that municipalities do not escape accountability for their "customs" and
"policies" that cause constitutional violations. Id.
9 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). In Thiboutot, recipients of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children benefits invoked § 1983, alleging that state officials had
denied them benefits to which they were entitled under the Social Security Act.
Id. at 3. The defendants argued that § 1983 should only apply to civil rights
laws and claims under the Equal Protection Clause because that was Congress'
intent in passing the original statute. Id. at 6-7. The Court acknowledged that
one of the principal purposes of adding the phrase "laws" to the statute's
predecessor was to "ensure that federal legislation providing specifically for
equality of rights would be brought within the ambit of the civil action
authorized by that statute." Id. at 7. (citations omitted). The Court, however,
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Section 1983 encompassed violations of federal statutory law as
well as constitutional law. 0 Thiboutot's recognition of the
Section 1983 cause of action for federal statutory violations
opened the federal courts to many litigants who otherwise would
have no remedy. Last, the Civil Rights Attorney's Pees Award
Act of 1976,101 passed in 1976, authorizes plaintiffs who prevail
in actions brought pursuant to Section 1983 to recover attorney
fees." ° These factors contributed to the development of Section
1983 as an integral part of the law and to the dramatic increase in
the number of Section 1983 actions.
C. Section 1983: Establishinga PrimaFacie Case
1. Legal Elements
Section 1983 enables private individuals to maintain a cause of
action to vindicate their federally protected rights against officials
who acted under color of state law.'0 In Mitchum v. Foster,""
the Court stated that "the very purpose of Section 1983 was to
concluded that that was not Congress' only purpose in amending the language
of the statute. Id.
1'0 Thiboutor, 448 U.S. at 4. The Court found a federal cause of action
under § 1983, refused to restrict § 1983's applicability to civil rights statutes
or to cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; instead, the Court rested its broad holding on the "plain
language" of the statute. Id. at 6-7.
'01 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1995). 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that in any
proceeding to enforce Section 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." Id. See also Brian Buckley, Washington Courts Get
Stingy: Improper Denial of Attorney's Fees Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1988, 70 WASHINGToN L. REv. 491, 494 (1995). Section 1988 was enacted in
direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society, which appeared to disallow attorney fee awards
under statutes which did not contain express authorization for such awards.
See also Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 41 U.S. 240
(1975).
102 See Schwartz, supra note 15, § 1.1 at 5.
'0 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (b) (1994).
" Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
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interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as
the people
guardians of the people's federal rights - to protect 105
law."
state
of
color
under
action
from unconstitutional
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, two major
elements are required. 1 6 First, the conduct complained of must
have been committed by a person acting under color of law.
Second, the challenged conduct must have deprived the plaintiff
of federal rights. 0 7 However, the following four requirements
are necessary in establishing a prima facie case:"' "(1) a violation
of rights protected by the federal constitution or created by
federal statue or regulation, (2) proximately caused (3) by the
conduct of a "person" (4) who acted "under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia. " "' A plaintiff in a Section 1983
action may recover compensatory and punitive damages, as well
as injunctive or declaratory relief."' In addition, a prevailing
party may recover reasonable attorney fees. 1 '
2. FunctionalRole
Section 1983 "fulfills the procedural or remedial role of
authorizing the assertion of the claim for relief." 1 2 However, the
1 13
statute itself does not grant or create any substantive rights.
Therefore, plaintiffs suing under Section 1983 must rely on
o5

Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242.

'06 42

U.S.C. § 1983. See also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).

'07 Id. at

640.

8 See Schwartz, supra note 15, § 1.4 at 12.
'09 Id. (citations omitted).
"0 See e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30 (1983); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1994).
1 See supranote 101 and accompanying information.
11"2
Schwartz, supranote 15, §1.4 at 13.
11 See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18
(1979) (holding that Section 1983 "by itself does not protect anyone against
anything."); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (providing that
Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United
States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.").
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another source, such as the United States Constitution or a federal
statute, for the substantive rights they seek to enforce.
3. Immwity Defenses
Many Section 1983 claimants seek to recover monetary
damages against state or local officials in their official capacity.
The official, however, may be able to defeat personal liability by
asserting a common law immunity as a defense." 4 Although
Section 1983 on its face contains no language addressing
immunities, the defenses are judicially created and stem from the
common law as it existed in 1871 when Congress enacted the
statute."' For example, prosecutors are absolutely immune from
liability for damages under Section 1983 with respect to activities
"intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process."" 6 In Imbler v. Pachtman, the Court articulated several
justifications for providing immunity to prosecutors for
prosecutorial acts, including a "concern that harassment by
unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's
energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would
shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of
judgment required by his public trust."" 7 Thus, to establish
liability, the plaintiff would have to point to "some other culprit,
such as a police detective who furnished false information or
withheld exculpatory information from the prosecutorial
authorities. ""s

"' See generally Schwartz, supra note 15, at §§ 9.1-12;

Nahmod, supra

note 21, at § 7:42; Richard A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under § 1983:
The Limits Of The Court's HistoricalAnalysis, 40 ARK. L.REv. 741 (1987)
(examining the historical analysis in immunity cases).

"' Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
116

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).

See also Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (holding prosecutorial statements at press
conferences not protected); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (holding that
absolute immunity available to prosecutors engaged in prosecutorial functions
did not extend to the provision of legal opinions by prosecutors).
"7Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23.
...
See Schwartz, supranote 6, at 3.
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The Court in Imbler left open the question of whether absolute
immunity extends to a prosecutor when he steps outside of his
role as advocate and engages in an investigatory or administrative

20
function." 9 In another prosecutorial decision, Burns v. Reed,1
the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's participation in a
probable cause hearing was clearly protected by absolute
immunity because his actions involved his role as advocate rather

than as administrator or investigative officer.12 1 The Court found,
however, that a prosecutor enjoys only qualified immunity for
giving advice to the police "in the investigative phase of a
criminal case."'
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,ZI the Supreme Court continued to

refine the contours of prosecutorial immunity.' 24 In Buckley, the
"9Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-3 1.
'20 500 U.S. 478 (1985).
121Id. at 491-92.
22 Id. at 493.
The Court reasoned that "[a]dvising the police in the
investigative phase of a criminal case" is not "so 'intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process' that it qualifies for absolute
immunity." Id. (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). Burns demonstrates that
the function that a prosecutor is engaged in is very difficult to figure out.
Schwartz, supra note 15, § 9.8 at 250-53.
123 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
"4 See generally Schwartz, supra note 15, §9.8 at 253. See also Kalina v.
Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997). In Kalina, the Supreme Court found a
prosecutor absolutely immune for activities undertaken in connection with
preparing and filing the information and the motion for the arrest warrant. Id.
at 509-10. The Court also held, however, that a prosecutor was not entitled to
absolute immunity when she swore under the penalties of perjury for the truth
of the matter contained in a "Certificate for Determination of Probable
Cause," in connection with the issuance of an arrest warrant. Id. at 509. The
Court explained:
[P]etitioner argues that the execution of the certificate was just one
incident in a presentation that, viewed as a whole, was the work of
an advocate and was integral to the initiation of the prosecution.
That characterization is appropriate for her drafting of the
certification, her determination that the evidence was sufficiently
strong to justify a probable-cause finding, her decision to file
charges, and her presentation of the information and the motion to
the court.
Each of those matters involved the exercise of
professional judgment; indeed, even the selection of the particular
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Supreme Court held that prosecutors were not absolutely immune
for holding a press conference announcing an indictment.' The
Court reasoned that comments to the media are not part of the
prosecutor's advocacy function and "have no functional tie to the
judicial process." 1 The Court also rejected the assertion of
absolute immunity to prosecutors in the face of allegations that
they had fabricated evidence during the pre-indictment stage.12
The prosecutors in Buckley were not functioning as advocates,
but in an investigative capacity, inasmuch as they lacked probable
cause to arrest or to initiate judicial proceedings during that
12
period. 8
In light of these Supreme Court decisions, Section 1983 claims
for malicious prosecution against prosecutors are likely to be
defeated by absolute immunity because the plaintiff would be
challenging the prosecutor's role as advocate.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION As A
CONSTmTTIONAL TORT

A. The Common Lav Roots ofMalicious Prosecution

facts to include on the certification to provide the evidentiary
support for the finding of probable cause required the exercise of the
judgment of the advocate. But that judgment could not affect the
truth or falsity of the factual statements themselves. Testifying

about facts is the function of the witness, not the lawyer.
Id.

lu'Buckley, 509 U.S. at 277.
,26 Id. at 277-78.
'27 Id. at 273. "When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions

normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is 'neither appropriate

nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not
the other.'" Id. (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir.

1973)).
'" Id. at 274.

"Their mission at that time was entirely investigative in

character. A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an
advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested." Id.
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"The interest in freedom from unjustifiable litigation is
protected by actions for malicious prosecution."'29 An important
feature of Eighteenth Century tort law was the malicious

prosecution action, which had its roots in a concern for the
integrity of the court.'30 At common law, the tort of malicious
prosecution provided a cause of action against "private defendants
for unjustified harm arising out of the misuse of government
processes."

3

In his treatise, Joel Bishop defined the tort as "the

putting in motion of any process of the law, and the carrying of it
forward until it terminates in favor of the one prosecuted,
maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause, to his

injury in respect either of personal security or of property.""3
129 W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 119
at 870 (5th ed. 1984).

'3 The historical analysis of the tort of malicious prosecution is treated in

full

detail in Note, Groundless Litigation & the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A
HistoricalAnalysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218 (1979).
"' Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992) (citing 2C. ADDISON, LAW OF TORTS
(1876), THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS (1879), JOEL P. BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON NON-CONTRACr LAW (1889)).
132 JOEL

P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON NON-CONTRACT LAw § 221, 89
(1889). Bishop wrote:
One who, having no reasonable or probable cause to set in motion
the law's processes against another, does it to promote some indirect
or sinister end, - termed, in legal language, doing it maliciously, -and thereby inflicts some legal injury on the other, such as arresting
his person, seizing his goods, or doing any other disturbance to his
person or property, or maligning him, or impairing his business
standing, or subjecting him to the labor and expense of a defense
beyond what he may have back in taxable costs, commits a civil
wrong for which the party injured is entitled to redress in what is
termed a suit for malicious prosecution. If the proceeding against
him was successful, he is estopped to assert that it was malicious
and without probable cause. Therefore, he cannot bring his action
for redress until that proceeding is terminated.
Id. § 250, at 103. Bishop, quoting Lord Campbell, C.J., discusses the
principle behind the malicious prosecution action; "to put into force the
process of the law maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause is
wrongful; and, if thereby another is prejudiced in property or person, there is
that conjunction of injury and loss which is the foundation of an action on the
case." Id. § 243, at 98 (quoting Churchill v. Siggers, 3 Ellis & B. 929, 937).
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Historically, an action for malicious prosecution was reserved
for traditional court prosecutions only.133 During the tenth and

eleventh centuries, courts were very concerned with malicious
prosecution because the price of losing a civil lawsuit was so
strong.

34

However, the tort evolved during the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries out of the ancient writ of conspiracy into an
13
action on the case 135 maintainable against a single defendant. 1
As early as 1285, various statutes were enacted to assist
individuals who had been maliciously accused or indicted of a
crime.

37

In such cases, the writ of conspiracy was employed to

seek redress.33 By the sixteenth century, the writ of conspiracy
'

33

Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423 (1942).

'3 See Note, supra note 130, at 1221.
See also PERCY HENRY WINFIELD,
THE HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEaAL PROCEDURE (Cambridge,

1921) (discussing abuse of legal procedure in Anglo-Saxon times). "The Laws
of Edgar provide that he who shall accuse another wrongfully, so that he either
in money or property be worse, shall, on disproof of the charge by the
accused, be liable in his tongue, unless he make compensation with his 'wer.'"
Id. at 4. (citations omitted).
15 See MARTIN L. NEWELL, MALICioUS PRosEcUriON 4 (1892). An "action
upon the case" was an action brought to recover damages for an injury for
which the ancient forms of the common law failed to provide a remedy. Id.
131
See W. Keeton, supra note 129, at 834; see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460
U.S. 325, 351 n.7 (1983) (Marshall, J. dissenting). See also Winfield, supra
note 134 at 118 (tracing the "decay of the writ of conspiracy and the
supersession of it to the action upon the case in the nature of conspiracy, which
ultimately developed into the modem action for malicious prosecution.").
"rSee Newell, supranote 135, at 6. An example of such a statute provided
in pertinent part:
Forasmuch as many, through Malice intended to grieve other, do
procure false appeals to be made of Homicides and other Felonies
by Appellors ...and the Appellors shall nevertheless restore to the
Parties appealed their Damages, according to the Discretion of
Justices, having respect to the Imprisonment or Arrestment that the
Party appealed hath sustained by reason of such Appeals, and to the
Infamy that they have incurred by the Imprisonment or otherwise,
and shall nevertheless make a grievous Fine upon the King.
Id. (citing 13 Ed I (St. West Il) c. 12 A.D. 1285).
" See Winfield, supra note 134, at 118 (providing numerous examples of
cases involving a writ of conspiracy). The writ of conspiracy was an
inadequate remedy in the Courts. Id.
There were many petitions for
amendment of the criminal law probably based upon the fact that the
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was replaced by an "action on the case" in the nature of a

conspiracy.' 39 In 1698, in Saville v. Roberts, 40 the English courts
began to recognize an action for malicious prosecution. 141 In
Saville, the court classified three alternative grounds upon which

an action can be brought: damage to one's fame, damage to one
in "peril of losing life, limb or liberty," and
damage to one's
142
himself.
defend
to
property when he is forced
By 1851, the United States Supreme Court recognized a

malicious prosecution action where prosecution occurred without
probable cause.'43 The tort of malicious prosecution provides a
remedy to parties injured by the improper use of judicial
proceedings.'

44

The common-law elements of the tort of

malicious prosecution are as follows: (1) the initiation of a
criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding must have terminated in
plaintiffs favor; (3) the proceeding must have been initiated
without probable cause; and (4) the defendant must have acted
45
with malice.

1

"corruption of officers and fear of great men" caused the law to be ineffectual.
Id. See also MARTIN L. NEWELL, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (1892) The writ
of conspiracy was only permitted to be used under two circumstances. Id. at
5. First, for a conspiracy to "procure a man to be indicted for treason" and
second, for a "conspiracy to prosecute a man for felony by which life was put
in danger." Id. at 7. See also Briscoe v. Prosser, 460 U.S. 325, 351 n.7
(1983).
...
See Winfield, supra note 134, at 118.
"~Savile v. Roberts, 1 Ld.Raym. 374, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 (K.B. 1698).
14"See Winfield, supra note 134, at 123.
In Savile, Lord Holt C.J.,
recognizing the need to stop malicious prosecutions, rejected the argument that
allowing an action for malicious prosecution would discourage prosecutions.
Id.
42
' Id. at 129 (referring to these three alternatives as "plinths upon which the
English Law has been reared - reputation, personal security, and property.").
143
Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1851).
'" See Keeton, supra note 129, at 870.
'4'See Id. at 871. See also RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 653.
This
section provides:
A private person who initiates or procures the institution of criminal
proceedings against another who is not guilty of the offense charged
is subject to liability for malicious prosecution if (a) he initiates or
procures the proceedings without probable cause and primarily for a
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MI. THE CIRcurrs IN CoNFLIcr BEFORE ALBRIGHT

Aibright v. Oliver marked the first time that the Court analyzed
the specific issue of whether malicious prosecution is actionable
under Section 1983.'" In order to understand the implications of
Albright, it is beneficial to analyze the wide divergence of preAlbright decisional law. As the Albright Court noted, "most of
the lower courts recognize some form of malicious prosecution
action under Section 1983."' 4 However, the problem lies in the
fact that most of the courts have disagreed on the elements of the
claim.

The Second and Third Circuits had adopted the most liberal
approach by allowing Section 1983 claims for malicious
prosecution when the elements of the common law tort were
alleged.'
For example in Lee v. Mihalich, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals directly equated the elements of a Section 1983
claim with the common law tort of malicious prosecution. 49 The
tauCts sdthar .tha at
A f brioW an offender to justice, and (b)
e proceedings have terminated in favor of the accused.
so MARIN L. NEWELL, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (1892). The
i&xn- ar a.atbr Anmrmnaea' pewm,auL" s iian S
.eta.v 4n
t 10. In his treatise, Newell stated that an action for malicious
a requires the institution of an action without probable cause, with
d acquittal of the accused.
Id. See also JOEL P. BISHOP,
'ARIES ON NON-CONTRACr LAw § 221, 89 (1889). Bishop similarly
hat an action for malicious prosecution would lie where plaintiff
w,malice and lack of probable cause, termination of the proceeding
;ht v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). See also Martin A. Schwartz,
3 Malicious Prosecution Case, N.Y.L.J., March 15, 1994, at 3;
Soto, Ruling Restricts Remedy for Malicious Prosecution, Chicago
Bulletin, Feb. 1, 1996 at 6.
,,ht, 510 U.S. at 811 n.4.
.g., Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989), Lee v. Mihalich,
66, 70 (3d Cir. 1988). See also Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 n.4.
different views and noting that the Third Circuit's view represented
xpansive approach).
847 F.2d. at 69-70. In Lee, a nursing home and its owner were

d by the Medicaid Fraud Unit of the Pennsylvania Attorney
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court held that "the elements of liability for the constitutional tort
of malicious prosecution under Section 1983 coincide with those
of the common law tort."'15 Therefore, under Lee, a plaintiff

could make out a valid Section 1983 claim merely by alleging the
common-law elements of malicious prosecution. 55
Likewise, the Second Circuit recognized a Section 1983 action
for malicious prosecution for deprivation of the Due Process
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 2 In Singleton v. City

of New York, the Second Circuit held that the common law
elements of the tort of malicious prosecution give rise to a
Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution."5 3 In White v.
General's office and were prosecuted for Medicaid fraud. Id. at 67.
Following the dismissal of the criminal action, Lee and the nursing home filed
a § 1983 action alleging malicious prosecution. Id.
"0oId. at 70.
'' But see Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998).
's' See, e.g., White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988); Singleton v. City
of New York, 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980). In Singleton, the court stated that
plaintiff was required to show a criminal prosecution instituted by the
defendant, termination in plaintiff's favor, the absence of probable cause, and
malice. Id. at 172.
" Singleton, 632 F.2d at 195. Jerome Singleton commenced a federal
Section 1983 action alleging assault, false arrest and malicious prosecution.
Id. at 187. Singleton had applied for and received an "adjournment in
contemplation of dismissal." The Second Circuit held that such adjournment
could not form the basis for a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim
because it was not a disposition of the criminal proceeding in favor of the
accused. Id. at 189. See also Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850 (2d Cir.
1992). In Roesch, the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff could not maintain a
§ 1983 claim for malicious prosecution when the plaintiff's criminal case was
terminated under an accelerated pretrial rehabilitation program. Id. at 853.
Comparing Connecticut's program to New York's "adjournment in
contemplation of dismissal," the court reasoned that "a dismissal pursuant to
the Connecticut accelerated pretrial rehabilitation program is not a termination
in favor of the accused for purposes of a civil rights suit." Id. The court
noted:
[i]f we permit a criminal defendant to maintain a section 1983 action
after taking advantage of accelerated rehabilitation, the program,
intended to give first-time offenders a second chance, would become
less desirable for the State to retain and less desirable for the courts
to use because the savings in resources from dismissing the criminal
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Frank,"s plaintiff bought a Section 1983 action against police
officers whose perjured testimony led to his improper
incarceration. 15 5 Applying the common law elements of the tort

of malicious prosecution, the Second Circuit allowed the Section
1983 claim noting that "[t]here can be no question that malicious
prosecution can form the basis for imposition of liability under

section 1983.156
In Hygh v. Jacobs,57 the Second Circuit, reiterating the
common law tort elements, stated that a Section 1983 claim for
malicious prosecution may not be maintained unless the plaintiff
proves a termination of a criminal proceeding in his favor."

Plaintiff brought a Section 1983 claim for constitutional
violations, including malicious prosecution, stemming from his
arrest for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.15 9

The

prosecution was dismissed against the plaintiff "in the interest of
justice. " 16 The court held that a dismissal "in the interest of
justice" is "neither an acquittal of the charges nor any
proceeding would be consumed in resolving the constitutional
claims.
Id. See also Raysor v. Port Authority, 768 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985).
'-' 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988).
155 Id. at 957. In White, the police officers argued that they were entitled to
absolute immunity based on their grand jury testimony. Id. at 958. However,
the court rejected their argument and concluded:
Where, however, the constitutional tort is the action of a police
officer in initiating a baseless prosecution, his role as a 'complaining
witness' renders him liable to the victim under § 1983, just as it did
at common law, and the fact that this testimony at a judicial
proceeding may have been the means by which he initiated the
prosecution does not permit him to transpose the immunity available
for defamation as a defense to malicious prosecution.
Id. at 961. Moreover, the White court recognized that although a grand jury
indictment is prima facie evidence of the probable cause requirement, this may
be rebutted by evidence that the defendant "misrepresented, withheld or
falsified
evidence." Id. (citations omitted).
156 1d. at 961 n.5.
'5 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1992).
l Id. at 363.
15 9 Id. at 361.
16 Id.
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determination of the merits .... Rather, it leaves the question
of guilt or innocence unanswered." 61 Therefore, the court
concluded that "it cannot provide the favorable termination
required as the basis for a claim of malicious prosecution." 162
The Fifth Circuit, at one time, held that malicious prosecution
was not encompassed within Section 1983.163 However, its more

recent cases have held that malicious prosecution is available
under Section 19832 64 In Sanders v. English," the court
recognized a Section 1983 malicious prosecution action. Plaintiff
Sanders, was arrested for armed robbery by McCoy, a police
lieutenant from the City of Mansfeld police department.' 66
Thereafter, information was brought to McCoy's attention that
Sanders was not the assailant.167 Nevertheless, McCoy filed an
information charging Sanders with the crime and did not divulge
the information to the police chief or prosecuting attorney.' 68
Eventually, the case was dismissed and Sanders brought a Section
1983 case alleging that McCoy violated his constitutional rights
by arresting and prosecuting him.' 69 The court stated that the
constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution is
"'sufficient to support a damage judgment against state law
enforcement officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,' including police
officers who have had input into the prosecutor's decision to
initiate criminal proceedings against an individual."1 7' The court
further stated that "[d]eliberately concealing or deliberately
failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, like 'maliciously
tendering false information,' can, as under the circumstances here
present, form the basis for an inference that a defendant police
61Id. at 368 (citations omitted).
162

id.

'63See, e.g., Cook v. Houston Post, 616 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1980); Curry v.
Ragan, 257 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1986).
164 See, e.g., Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1992); Brummet v.
Camble, 946 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1991).
'65950 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1992).
'66 Id. at 1154.

167id.
168id.
169
Id.
170

Id. at 1163 (quoting Hand v. Gray, 838 F.2d 1420 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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officer acted with malice in initiating and maintaining a
17
prosecution." 1
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's analysis and
found a "federal right to be free from malicious prosecution.""
In Strengh v. Hubert,73 plaintiff brought a section 1983 claim
against the investigator for the office of the Alabama Attorney
General alleging that the defendants conspired, "under the color
of law," to cause their wrongful prosecution in violation of their
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights." The court held that
the right to be free from malicious prosecution is a federal right
which is protected by Section 1983.175 The court reasoned that

"'a safeguard so fundamental to criminal due process - one

against capricious prosecutions fourteenth amendment.' "176

is... incorporated by the

Other circuits required a plaintiff to show more than the
elements of the common law tort. For example, the Ninth Circuit
took the position that a claim for malicious prosecution is not
available under Section 1983 if there is a remedy available within
the state judicial system, unless the claim is accompanied by an
intent to deprive an individual of a constitutional right.'" In
171Id.

(quoting Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 162-63 (4th Cir. 1989)).

'2 Strengh v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425 (11th Cir. 1938) (quoting Shaw v.
Garrison, 467 F.2d 113, i20 cert. denied 409 U.S. 1024 (5th Cir. 1972))
(recognizing that "freedom from malicious prosecution is a federal right
protected by Section 1983."). See NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1563
(11th Cir. 1990) ("[Plaintiff] must show that the parties 'reached an
understanding' to deny the plaintiff his or her rights. . . [and] prove an
actionable wrong to support the conspiracy.").
173 854 F.2d 421 (11th Cir. 1988).
174 Id. at 423.
175 Id.
76
Id. at 425 (citing Wheeler v. Cosden Oil & Chemical Co., 734 F.2d 254,

260 (5th Cir.) amended 744 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1984)).
'7' Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987). See also
Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (concluding
that "malicious prosecution generally does not constitute a deprivation of
liberty without due process of law and is not a federal constitutional tort if
process is available within the state judicial systems to remedy such wrongs.");
Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that allegations in a
complaint that state officials had denied plaintiff a fair trial by bribing
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Usher v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth"Circuit held that a claim
for malicious prosecution may be made under Section 1983 when
the "'malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to
deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise
intended to subject a person to a denial of constitutional
rights."' 178 In his complaint, Usher alleged that defendants
illegally arrested him, submitted false police reports, initiated his
prosecution in bad faith and acted with racial animus towards

Because the defendants intended to deprive him of his
equal protection rights, the court concluded that Usher had
properly stated a cause of action under Section 1983 for malicious
prosecution. "'
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held that malicious prosecution
can form the basis for a Section 1983 action if the defendant's
him.

79

conduct infringes upon some constitutional right.8

The court's

decision in Gunderson v. Schlueter is especially instructive
because that court tested plaintiff's allegations under due
process.182 In Gunderson, a conservation officer brought criminal

charges against plaintiff, a resort operator, for various fish and

witnesses, stirring up adverse medical attention and knowingly presenting false
evidence and perjured testimony were sufficient to state a cause of action under
§ 1983).
"78 Usher, 828 F.2d at 562 (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1310
(9th Cir. 1987)). In Usher, plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action against Los
Angeles police officers after he was tried and acquitted of disturbing the peace,
malicious mischief, and resisting police officers. Id. at 558. Usher alleged
that he was taken to the police department where he was forced to remain in
handcuffs for two hours, was refused access td a toilet and was physically
abused by the officers who referred to him as a "nigger." Id. Ultimately,
Usher was discharged from his employment after his employer investigated the
events surrounding the arrest. Id.
179

Id.

180 Id.
181 See, e.g., Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972 (8th Cir.
1993) (dismissing a malicious prosecution action because the court found no
constitutional violation); Gunderson v. Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.
1990) (holding that malicious prosecution alone is not punishable under
§ 1983).
82 Gunderson v. Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1990).
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game violations."' The plaintiff was acquitted of the charges and
brought a Section 1983 suit alleging malicious prosecution and a

substantive due process violation."' The court ruled that plaintiff
received the procedural due process to which he was entitled, and

that the officer's conduct, which was much more egregious than
that alleged, was not sufficiently outrageous to support a
substantive due process
claim. s
Hence, there was no
1 16
injury.
constitutional
The Sixth Circuit also took a restrictive view of Section 1983
with regards to claims of malicious prosecution, requiring a
violation of rights specifically protected by the Constitution.'""
Relying on its prior decision in Dunn v. Tennessee,' the Sixth
Circuit held in Coogan v. City of Wixon 8 9 that a Section 1983

claim for malicious prosecution is only available when "the
'misuse of a legal proceeding is so egregious as to subject the
aggrieved individual to a deprivation of constitutional

"3lId. at 410. In 1984, Schlueter, a conservation officer, began to single out
the customers at Gunderson's resort for stricter enforcement of the fish and
game laws.
Id. at 408.
When Schlueter discovered that Gunderson
complained to Schlueter's supervisor, Schlueter told Gunderson "people who
file complaints on me live to regret it." Id. Thereafter, Schlueter began an
undercover investigation of Gunderson, which was characterized as rising to
the
level of "harassment." Id.
1
84 Id.
18 Id. at 410-11. While the court acknowledged that outrageous conduct by
law enforcement authorities that "shocks the conscience" might violate due
process even without a procedural violation, nevertheless, the court concluded
that the officer's conduct, while "objectionable and perhaps born of a personal
animosity toward the plaintiff," did not rise to the level needed to prove a due
process violation. Id. at 411.

186 Id.
'7 See, e.g., Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1990). See
also Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1987) (refusing to
recognize plaintiff's § 1983 claim because the alleged injury did not result in a
constitutional violation); Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1982)
(applying this standard, the court found that plaintiff's claim of malicious
prosecution stated a valid cause of action under the Fourth Amendment).
" ' 697 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1982).
'89 820 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1987).
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dimension.'" 1' 9 In Coogan, plaintiff, a real estate developer, was
prosecuted for allegations that he had burned insured property.' 9'

After his prosecution was dismissed, plaintiff brought a Section
1983 malicious prosecution action against the City of Wixom.' 92
The court refused to recognize the plaintiff's claim, reasoning
that the plaintiff neither established the absence of probable

cause, nor proved any constitutional injury.' 93
Like the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the First Circuit has required

that a plaintiff must show egregious conduct in order to bring a
Section 1983 claim of malicious prosecution.' 94 In Torres v.
Superintendent of Police, the First Circuit set forth the specific
requirements for a Section 1983 claim based on malicious
prosecution. 95 In recognizing a categorical difference between
tort claims for malicious prosecution and constitutional claims
arising from the same tort, the court stated that malicious
prosecution does not per se abridge rights secured by the
Constitution. 96 Therefore, in order to state a claim for malicious

prosecution under Section 1983, the complaint must allege that
the malicious conduct was "so egregious that it violated
substantive or procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth
"9o Coogan, 820 F.2d at 175 (quoting Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 125
(6th Cir. 1982)).
'9' Id. at 174.
192Id.

" Id. Furthermore, the court held that the City of Wixom could not be held
responsible for the action of its officers. Id.
"9See, e.g., Smith v. Department of Corrections, 936 F.2d 1390 (1st Cir.
1991); Morales v. Ramirez, 906 F.2d 784 (1st Cir. 1990); See also, Torres v.
Superintendent of Police, 893 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1990) (explicitly recognizing
existence of specific constitutional tort for malicious prosecution).
195 Torres, 893 F.2d at 409. In Torres, plaintiffs were former police officers
in the Puerto Rico Police Department who had been dismissed from their jobs
for alleged violations of certain weapon laws. Id. at 406. After the criminal
charges against them were dismissed, plaintiffs commenced a § 1983 suit
claiming that the defendants brought baseless charges against them without
probable cause but "for reasons of personal animosity." Id. at 408.
" Id. See Baker v. McCollan, 442 U.S. 137 (1979) ("The Constitution does
not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would
provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted - -, indeed, for every
suspect released.").
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Amendment."19 7 According to the First Circuit, a substantive due
process violation occurs when the malicious prosecution is
"conscience shocking"" and a procedural due process violation
occurs when the plaintiff was deprived "of liberty by a distortion
and corruption of the processes of law."'99 Furthermore, to
establish a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 on the
grounds of a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must
show that "no adequate state post-deprivation remedy was
20
available to rectify the harm." D
Although many of the lower courts had found malicious
prosecution actionable under Section 1983, the lower courts
widely disagreed on the elements of the constitutional claim.
Thus, it is no wonder that without clear guidance, a wide
divergence of approaches to malicious prosecution under Section
1983 developed in the lower courts. It was against this backdrop,
then, that the United States Supreme Court decided Albright v.
Oliver.

IV. ALBRIGHT V. OLIVER
A. Background
In Albright, Veda Moore, a cocaine addict, approached Roger
Oliver, a detective in the City of Macomb, Illinois police
department, for protection from an individual to whom she owed
money for cocaine.20 ' In exchange for police protection, Moore
agreed to act as an informant against narcotic dealers. ' Pursuant
to this arrangement, Moore was required to identify dealers and
then purchase drugs from them with money supplied to her by
'9 Torres, 893 F.2d at 410.

" Id. The court emphasized that "misuse of the legal process alone will not
be enough to sustain a claim." Id.
199 Id.

...Id. In Torres, the First Circuit did not find that the charges brought
against the former police officers, which were later dismissed, rose to the level
of a constitutional violation. Id. at 409-11.
"oAlbright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 293 n.3 (1994) (Stevens J., dissenting).
2

id.
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Oliver .203 Additionally, she was to be paid a small sum of money
for each dealer that she identified. 2°' As it turned out, Moore,
acting as an informant, had implicated more than fifty dealers,
none of whom were successfully prosecuted. 0 5
During her tenure as an undercover informant, Moore reported
to Oliver that she had purchased cocaine from John Albright,
Jr.206 Laboratory tests revealed that the substance sold to Moore,
was not cocaine, but was, in fact, baking powder. 2 7 Thereafter,
Oliver secured a grand jury indictment against John Albright, Jr.,
for selling a "look alike" substance. 08 When Oliver went to
execute the warrant he learned that John Albright, Jr. was a sixtyyear old retired pharmacist; Oliver realized that he had the wrong
man. 219 At that time, Oliver also advised that John Albright, Jr.
had two sons, John David Albright and Kevin Aibright.21° After
Oliver had determined that John David Albright could not have
2

Id.

' Brief for Respondent at 6, Albright (No. 92-833). Specifically, Oliver
gave Moore between $50.00 and $75.00 for every transaction she completed.
Id.
20
Albright, 510 U.S. at 293 n.3 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 268 n. 1.
W7

id.

Id. at 293 n.4. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See ILL. COMP. STAT.
570/404 (c) (West 1993). The statute provides in pertinent part: "[lit is
unlawful for a person to possess a look-alike substance." Id. Section 102(y)
of Act 570 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Look-alike substances means a substance, other than a controlled
substance which (1) by overall dosage unit, appearance, including
shape, color, size, markings or lack thereof, taste, consistency, or
any other identifying physical characteristic of the substance, would
lead a reasonable person to believe that the substance is a controlled
substance, or (2) is expressly or impliedly represented to be a
controlled substance or is distributed under circumstances which
would lead a reasonable person to believe that the substance is a
controlled substance.
Id.
209 Albright, 510 U.S. at 268 n.1.
"Albright was an elderly, respectable,
inoffensive gentleman unlikely to have committed the offense of which Veda
Moore had accused him." Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 344 (7th Cir.
1992).
2

210

Id.
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committed the crime, he contacted Moore to determine whether
she purchased the narcotics from Kevin Albright."' When Moore
admitted that Kevin Albright could have been the drug dealer,
Oliver executed a criminal information charging Kevin Albright
with the sale of a "look-alike" substance and proceeded to change
the arrest warrant to reflect the name of Kevin Albright."' Upon
learning that an arrest warrant had been issued against him,
Kevin Albright turned himself into the Macomb police
department, but denied any involvement in the alleged crime."'
Kevin Albright was released after he posted a bond." 4 However,
as a condition of his bond, he was not permitted to leave the state
of Illinois without permission of the court.2 5 At a preliminary
hearing, Oliver testified that Kevin Albright sold a "look-alike"
substance to Veda Moore. 6 Before the trial, the circuit court
dismissed the criminal action against Kevin Albright, on the basis
that "the charge did not state an offense under Illinois Law.' 7
Almost two years later, petitioner Kevin Albright instituted a
Section 1983 action against both police officer Roger Oliver and
the City of Macomb, alleging that they had violated his rights
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
specifically, "his 'liberty interest' to be free from criminal
prosecution except upon probable cause." 2 9 The district court
dismissed Albright's complaint for failure to state a claim under

211

Id. Suspecting that John David Albright was the drug dealer, Oliver

altered the arrest warrant to reflect the name of John David Albright. Brief for
Respondent at 8, Albright (No. 92-833). In response to the warrant, John
David Albright traveled from Chicago, Illinois to Macomb where he met with
Oliver and advised him that he had been working in Chicago for the previous
year and was not in Macomb on the date in question. Id.
212 id.

213
214

Albright, 510 U.S. at 268.
Id.

215

Id.

2t6/id.

21

7 Id.

218 id.

219

Id. at 269.

In his complaint, Albright also alleged a common law

malicious prosecution claim. Id. at 271 n.2.
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Section 1983.220 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in

an opinion by Judge Posner, affmned the decision of the district
court.221 The court acknowledged that "malicious prosecution can
be a component of a constitutional tort," however, prosecution
without probable cause may be actionable under Section 1983
only when accompanied by "incarceration or other palpable
consequences."' 22 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the issue of whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual's rights to be free
from prosecution without probable cause.'

B. The Different Opinions of the Court
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, began the
Court's analysis by identifying the specific constitutional
provision allegedly infringed by the State.'
In his complaint,
Albright alleged a deprivation of his "substantive due process
rights to be free of prosecution without probable cause. 225 The
plurality pointed out that Albright did not allege a procedural due
process claim or a violation of his right to be from seizure under
Id. at 269.
22' Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 1992).

Id. at 346-347. Analogizing malicious prosecution to defamation, Judge
Posner reasoned that "[i]f the injuries that defamation imposes do not
constitute a deprivation of liberty or property within the meaning of the due
process clause, then neither do the injuries that malicious prosecution
imposes." Id. at 346. However, "[d]efamation accompanying a discharge
from employment can make it impossible for a person to obtain equivalent
employment elsewhere, thus depriving him of liberty of occupation, one of the
liberties protected by the due process clause." Id. See Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976).
22 Albright, 510 U.S. at 268.
2 Id. at 271. Immediately pointing out that "§ 1983 'is not a source of
substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal
rights elsewhere conferred.'" Id. (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137
(1979)).
=5 Id.
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the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding the plurality's
concession that Albright's surrender to the police "constituted a
seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.""' Chief Justice
Rehnquist, quoting from Collins v. City of Harker Heights,'
acknowledged the Court's persistent reluctance to expand
substantive due process, noting that the "guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce
and open-ended." 2 The right to be free of prosecution, he
explained, did not fall within the realm of cases to which
substantive due process has been typically employed: "marriage,
family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity."'
Invoking the Court's decision in Hurtado v. Cafomia,"
Albright argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended, in part, to protect an individual from
arbitrary exercises of governmental power.2
While
acknowledging that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects substantive rights intended to secure
individuals from the arbitrary exercise of government power, the
Chief Justice pointed out that in criminal prosecutions, the
Constitution does not limit its analysis to whether the
government's conduct was arbitrary.m Supreme Court precedent
over the past one hundred years since the Hurtado decision has
incorporated many of the specific protections in the Bill of Rights
into the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 3 As a result, the plurality
concluded that it is the provision of the Bill of Rights, not the
general notion of due process, that was intended by the framers to
2 id.

22'503 U.S. 115 (1992).
22 Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72. See also County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).
2Id.
at 272.
230 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (holding that an individual has the right to be
free from the "arbitrary exercise of the powers of government" as a part of his
or her substantive liberty interest).
2"Albright, 510 U.S. at 272.

232

Id.

3' Id. at 272-273 (pointing to a series of cases that incorporated the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment).
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provide protections against arbitrary abuses of power."
Applying the principle enunciated in Graham v. Connor, 5 the
plurality posited that where a specific Amendment to the

Constitution addresses the type of government action at issue, that
Amendment must be used to analyze the Section 1983 claim, not
substantive due process."
Applying this principle to Albright's claim, the plurality
determined that the Fourth Amendment serves as the sole source
of constitutional protection against arbitrary pretrial deprivations
of liberty.237 The Chief Justice explained that the Fourth

Amendment relates to "deprivations of liberty that go hand in
hand with criminal prosecutions.""

Having concluded that

Albright's claim should have been brought under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court refused to recognize Albright's due
process claim "to be free from criminal prosecution except upon
probable cause."

9

Finally, the plurality expressed no opinion as

to whether Albright's claim could have succeeded under the

3'Id. at 273. "It was through these provisions of the Bill of Rights that the
Framers sought to restrict the exercise of arbitrary authority by the
Government in particular situations." Id.
235 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
In Graham, an excessive force arrest
situation, the Court refused to recognize the claim under substantive due
process holding that a claim for excessive force on the part of police officers
during an arrest, or other seizure of a person, must be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment standard. Id. The Court reasoned that "the Fourth
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection
against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,'
must be the guide for analyzing" claims involving seizures. Id.
2 6
Albright, 510 U.S. at 273. "Where a particular Amendment 'provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of
government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'" Id.
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
23
Id. at 274. The Court maintained that "[tjhe Framers considered the
matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to
address it." Id.
23
Id.
239 Id. at 268.
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Fourth Amendment because the issue was not presented to the
Court in the petition for certiorari.m
In his brief concurrence, Justice Scalia elaborated on the issue
of substantive due process." First, he noted that there are many
cases in which "abuses of the trial process" can lead to 42
a
"deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process."
Nevertheless, Albright's pre-trial arrest provided the only
deprivation of liberty claim. 3 Justice Scalia reiterated his
objection to the concept of substantive due process, maintaining
that the Due Process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment
only guarantee that certain procedures are followed as a
prerequisite to a deprivation of liberty.2' Justice Scalia asserted
that substantive due process cannot be used to bestow greater
constitutional
guarantees than those afforded by the Bill of
45
Rights.
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the plurality that Albright's claim
is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, but unlike the
plurality, addressed Albright's Fourth Amendment claim. "4' She
articulated two theories as to why Albright failed to assert a
Fourth Amendment claim: the inapplicability of the Fourth
Amendment and second, the running of the statute of limitations
applicable to this claim 7 Justice Ginsburg concluded that
Albright's possible Fourth Amendment claim was "neither
substantially deficient nor inevitably time barred." 4
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Ginsburg rejected
Albright's limited view of the Fourth Amendment.2 49 She opined
240 Id. at 275.
2

'

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).

. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "it is unlikely that the procedures
constitutionally 'due,' with regard to an arrest, consist of anything more than
what the Fourth Amendment specifies; but petitioner has in any case not
invoked 'procedural' due process.").

' Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
'5 Id.
'6 ld.
' Id.
Id.
Id.

at 276 (Scalia, J., concurring).
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
at 276 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
at 280 (Ginsburg, I., concurring).
at 279 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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that Albright anticipated that the Court would define "seizure" as
the period from his surrender until his release on bond, and thus
Oliver's allegedly misleading testimony could not be analyzed
under the Fourth AmendmentY ° Responding to this assumption,
Justice Ginsburg asserted that, at common law, a "seizure"
continued even after an individual's release from custody. 251 She
believed that this view comported with "common sense and
common understanding," because a person is not free simply due
to the fact that he or she is not under the "physical grip" of the
State.2 2 Rather, he must appear in court at the State's request,
and may be restricted from traveling outside of the State without
first seeking the State's permission." 3 In addition, pending
criminal prosecution, the defendant's "employment prospects
may be diminished severely, he may suffer reputational harm,
and he will experience the financial and emotional strain of
preparing a defense." 2" Under Justice Ginsburg's "continued
seizure" theory, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure remains throughout the criminal
prosecution. 55 Thus, if an officer gave false or misleading
testimony during the course of a criminal prosecution, he may be
acting in violation of the Fourth Amendment.2- 6
It follows, Justice Ginsburg stated, that the statute of limitations
had not begun to run at the time that Albright turned himself in to
the police,

7

but was triggered only when the State dropped the

charges against Albright.28 Therefore, the Justice concluded that
Albright's possible Fourth Amendment claim was "neither
substantially deficient nor inevitably time-barred. " 259 Justice
Id. at 277 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
?'52 Id. at 277-78 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
2

2,

Id. at 278 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
4 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
255 Id. at 279 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
256
Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 280 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d
903, 908 (6th Cir. 1988)).
259 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
53

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss4/26

40

Schonfeld: Malicious Prosecution

1999

MALICIO US PROSECUTION

1721

Ginsburg, however, found that Albright had abandoned the claim
in the district court. °
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed with the
plurality's holding that a claimed arrest without probable cause
invoked the Fourth Amendment and not substantive due
process.26' However, Justice Kennedy believed that Albright's
claim was not one of unreasonable seizure, but "the malicious
initiation of a baseless criminal prosecution against him." 2
Therefore, the Justice analyzed the criminal prosecution under the
due process clause.' Pointing out the lack of a provision in the
Bill of Rights concerning the initiation of a criminal prosecution,
Justice Kennedy conceded that a "criminal rle" that does not
contravene a specific guarantee in the Bill of Rights may still
violate the Due Process Clause if it infringes upon a fundamental
principle of justice.2" In Justice Kennedy's opinion, Albright
failed to meet this standard.? Next, Justice Kennedy turned to
the possibility that there may be a due process violation in
malicious prosecution, noting that the Due Process Clause may
safeguard interests similar to those protected by the common law
of torts.

6

However, relying on Parratt v. Taylor,767 Justice

Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

"The principle of party presentation

cautions decisionmakers against asserting it for him."
I., concurring).
' Id. at 281 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
26 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Id. at 281 (Ginsburg,

Id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Kennedy stated
that government conduct may still violate the Due Process Clause if it
"'offends some principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Id. (quoting Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)). See also Medina v. California, 505 U.S.

437 (1992).
26Albright, 510 U.S. at 283 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 283-84 (Kennedy, I., concurring). "The common law of torts long
recognized that a malicious prosecution, like a defamatory statement, can
cause unjustified torment and anguish - both by tarnishing one's name and by
costing the accused money in legal fees and the like." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy reasoned that "some of the interests granted
historical protection by the common law of torts (such as the interests in
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Kennedy asserted that when a post-deprivation remedy exists, a
Section 1983 due process cause of action will be denied. 2 8 Based
upon the availability in Illinois of a malicious prosecution

remedy, Justice Kennedy interpreted the Court's decision in
Parratt as foreclosing the availability of Section 1983 relief to
Albright.269
Justice Souter, concurring, like the plurality expressed
reluctance to expand the protection of substantive due process if
doing so would duplicate protections already addressed by other

constitutional provisions. 2
He found that Albright had "not
shown a substantial
deprivation of liberty from the mere initiation
"
of prosecution. 27

Justice Souter reasoned that none of the

freedom from defamation and malicious prosecution) are protected by the Due
Process Clause." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
"'7 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
w Albright, 510 U.S. at 284 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Citing Parratt,
Justice Kennedy stated that "a state actor's random and unauthorized
deprivation of that interest cannot be challenged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so
long as the State provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy." (citations
omitted). Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy explained that
"some questions of property, contract, and tort law are best resolved by state
legal systems without resort to the federal courts, even when a state actor is
the alleged wrongdoer." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy
conceded that courts are reluctant to apply the Parrattdoctrine because they
recognize "the important role federal courts have assumed in elaborating vital
constitutional guarantees against arbitrary or oppressive state action." Id.
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
20 Id. at 285-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
270 Id. at 288 (Souter, J., concurring.) Justice Souter stated:
We are, nonetheless, required by '[t]he doctrine of judicial selfrestraint... to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to
break new ground in [the] field' of substantive due process ....
The importance of recognizing the latter limitation is underscored by
pragmatic concerns about subjecting government actors to two
(potentially inconsistent) standards for the same conduct and
needlessly imposing on trial courts the unenviable burden of
reconciling well-established jurisprudence under the Fourth and
Eighth Amendments with the ill-defined contours of some novel due
process right.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
27 Id. at 289 (Souter, J., concurring).
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injuries complained of by Albright could be attributable solely to
the criminal prosecution. 2' Injuries similar to those alleged by
Albright typically occur after an arrest, and are better addressed
under the Fourth Amendment.'
However, Justice Souter left
I
open the possibility that " t]here may indeed be exceptional cases
where some quantum of harm occurs in the interim period after
groundless criminal charges are filed but before any Fourth
Amendment seizure."'
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Blackmun, opined that substantive due process should reach
claims of malicious prosecution."7
As a preliminary matter,
Justice Stevens pointed out that the Fifth Amendment,276 which
This rule of reserving due process for otherwise homeless
substantial claims no doubt informs those decisions... in which the
Court has resisted relying on the Due Process Clause when doing so
would have duplicated protection that a more specific constitutional
provision already bestowed. This case calls for such restraint, in
presenting no substantial burden on liberty beyond what the Fourth
Amendment is generally thought to redress already.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Albright's complaint provided:
[Aln extensive list of damages: limitations on his liberty, freedom
of association, and freedom of movement by virtue of the terms of
his bond; financial expense of his legal defense; reputational harm
among members of the community; inability to transact business or
obtain employment in his local area, necessitating relocation to St.
Louis; inability to secure credit; and personal pain and suffering.
Id. (Souter, I., concurring).
z' Id. at 290 (Souter, J., concurring).
274 Id. at 291
(Souter, J., concurring).
275
Id. at 291-316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
276 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger, nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
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provides the standard for issuing criminal accusations by the
federal government, requires a determination by a grand jury that
there exists probable cause to support the accusation.277 Next, he
examined whether state governments have similar constraints
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. '7
According to Justice Stevens, Hurtado v. Californi2 79 indirectly
established that states are required to adequately ensure that
probable cause exists before the initiation of a criminal

proceeding."'

Applying this analysis to Albright's claim, the

dissent concluded that the probable cause requirement of the Due

Process Clause had not been satisfied."8
Justice Stevens emphasized the "interests protected by the Due

Process Clause extend well beyond freedom from improper
criminal conviction." 8 2 Although the Justice recognized that not
every impairment of a liberty interest amounts to a constitutional
Albright, 510 U.S. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27' 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
In Hurtado, the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not require the states to comply with the grand jury indictment
mandated for the federal government by the Fifth Amendment, but only
because the state had competent assurances for a valid probable cause
determination. Id. at 538. The Court reasoned:
Tried by these principles, we are unable to say that the substitution
for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding
by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate,
certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on
his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the
witnesses produces for the prosecution, is not due process of law.
Id.
2' Albright, 510 U.S. at 292 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2"Id. at 292-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens pointed out that the
evidence against Albright consisted of false accusations from a cocaine addict
who had falsely accused cocaine dealers in over fifty other cases. Id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Moreover, the alleged substance turned out to be a "lookalike" substance, and not to be cocaine. Id. at 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, relying on this information, Oliver testified before a grand jury
and sought an indictment against Albright. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus,
the dissent found it "shocking" that a criminal proceeding was commenced on
such "scanty grounds." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Albright. v.
Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992)).
' Id. at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27
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deprivation, an accusation of a serious criminal offense is the
type of state action that has a direct impact on a constitutionally
protected liberty interest.m
Having established Albright's
entitlement to due process, the dissent discussed how much due
process is required to deprive an accused of such a liberty
interest."
Justice Stevens opined that a probable cause
requirement is a prerequisite to a criminal prosecution, finding it
would be analogous to other requirements that the Court has
considered as essential to due process.'
Justice Stevens looked
6
to In re Winship, which established the requirement that a
criminal conviction be established by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, to support a probable cause requirement. 7 In Albright,
the state of Illinois followed certain procedures to guarantee that
probable cause had been established."
However, Albright did
not claim that the actual procedures followed by the state were
inadequate. 9 Rather, Albright's claim was that, in his case, the
probable cause determination was invalid as a substantive matter

m Id. at 294-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 296 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2N Id. (Stevens, T., dissenting).
2

It has been the historical practice in our jurisprudence to withhold
the filing of criminal charges until the state can marshal evidence
establishing probable cause that an identifiable defendant has

committed a crime. This long tradition is reflected in the common
law tort of malicious prosecution, as well as in our cases. In
addition, the probable cause requirement serves valuable societal
interests, protecting the populace from the whim and caprice of
governmental agent without unduly burdening the government's

prosecutorial function.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
26

397 U.S. 358 (1970) (relying on history and societal interests to support

its finding).
2' Albright, 510 U.S. at 296 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Consistent with our
reasoning in Winship, these factors lead to the conclusion that one element of
the 'due process' prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment is a responsible
decision that there is probable cause to prosecute." Id. (Stevens, 3.,
dissenting).
Id. at 297-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2

Id. at 298 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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because it was tainted and unsupported by reliable evidence.29
Justice Stevens concluded that compliance with valid procedures
by a state for the initiation of a criminal prosecution would not,
by itself, preserve a conviction based upon false evidence.29
In Justice Stevens' view, the plurality's analysis suffered "two
glaring flaws."'92 First, the Fifth Amendment, rather than the
Fourth Amendment, protects the type of pretrial deprivation of
liberty challenged in this case.2 93 Second, he faulted the plurality
for claiming that the Due Process Clause is limited by the specific

guarantees contained within the Bill of Rights.2 94 As Justice
Stevens noted, the view taken by the plurality was previously
adopted by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Adamson v.
2 95 which advanced
California,
his theory that the Due Process
Clause incorporated the entire Bill of Rights and "that the express
guarantees of the Bill of Rights mark the outer limit of Due

Process protection. 2 96 That position had never been accepted by
a majority of the Supreme Court. 297 Rather, the Court has
recognized certain violations of the Due Process Clause not
specifically delineated within the Bill of Rights.293
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Ginsburg's view that the
seizure of Albright was unreasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth

Amendment.299

However,

he

questioned

Justice

0Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Albright argued that the determination as to
probable cause was invalid because "it was wholly unsupported by reliable
evidence and tainted by Oliver's disregard or suppression of facts bearing on
the reliability of his informant." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9'id. at 299 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Even if prescribed procedures are
followed meticulously, a criminal prosecution based on perjured testimony, or
evidence on which 'no rational trier of fact' could base a finding of probable
cause... simply does not comport with the requirements of the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
2 Id. at 302 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29'
Id. at 303 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
295
332 U.S. 46 (1947)
2'6
Albright, 510 U.S. at 303 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Ginsburg's conclusion that the complaint should be dismissed."
Justice Stevens asserted that waiver of Albright's Fourth
Amendment "seizure" claim should not preclude the availability

of a Fifth Amendment claim for injuries arising 301from the
initiation of a baseless criminal proceeding against him.
Justice Stevens found Justice Kennedy's reliance on Parrat v.
Taylor unpersuasive. 3°

Justice Stevens viewed Parratt as

"limited to situations in which no constitutional violation
occurs." 30 3 Justice Stevens distinguished Parrat, noting that
Parrattinvolved the negligent act of state officials, specifically,

"a type of ordinary tort that can be committed by anyone." 31
3W

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

0'Id. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

The dissent stated "[b]ecause the
constitutional protection against unfounded accusations is distinct from, and
somewhat broader than, the protection against unreasonable seizures, there is
no reason why an abandonment of a claim based upon seizure should constitute
a waiver." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that "the scope
of the Fourth Amendment protection does not fully encompass the liberty
interest at stake - as in this case- it is both unwise and unfair to place a bidder
on the lens that focuses on the specific right being asserted." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Stevens criticized Justice Souter's concurrence for
implying that Albright's claim would require the Court to "break new ground"
and "enter unchartered territory." Id. at 310-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Noting the "stark" contrast between the claims in Albright and Collins, Justice
Stevens criticized Justice Souter's reliance on Collins, stating petitioners claim
in Collins was "unprecedented." Id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also
Collins v. Harker Heights, 503'U.S. 115 (1992). According to Justice
Stevens, Albright's claim to be free from prosecution without probable cause
has existed since the days of the Magna Carta. Albright, 510 U.S. at 310-11
(Stevens, I., dissenting).
The right of individual citizens to be secure from an open and public
accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a
public trial, before a probable cause is established by the
presentment and indictment of a grand jury, in case of high
offences, is justly regarded as one of the securities to the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive public prosecutions, and as
one of the ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty.
Id. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329,
344 (1857)).
Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 313-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens found Parratt inapplicable to deprivations of

property or liberty that are officially authorized." 5 The dissent
argued that Albright was specifically denied his constitutional
fights when the state intentionally subjected him to criminal
prosecution, depriving him of his -liberty interest under the
Constitution. 0 6 Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded "[tihe
remedy for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause provided by Section 1983 is not limited, as Justice
Kennedy posits.., to cases in which the injury has been caused
by 'a state law, policy, or procedure.' 30 7 Rather, "Section 1983
provides a cause of action against '[e]very person' who under
color of state authority causes the 'deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws.' )308
In sum, Albright produced six different opinions covering a

wide variety of different issues. The common theme that runs
through the plurality and concurring opinions is that substantive
due process is not available in a claim such as Albright's, when

SId. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent opined:
The rationale of [Parrat]is inapplicable to this case whether one
views the claim at issue as substantive or procedural. If one views
the petitioner's claim as one of substantive due process, Parrattis
categorically inapplicable... Conversely, if one views his claim as
one of procedural due process, is also inapplicable, because its
rationale does not apply to officially authorized deprivations of
liberty or property.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
06 Id. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Petitioner was subjected to criminal
charges by an affirmative, deliberate act of a state official. The filing of
criminal charges is effectuated through established state procedures under
which government agent, such as respondent Oliver, are authorized to act."
Id. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
307 Id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Kennedy concluded by
noting the diversity of opinions by the Court and the fact that none of them
reject his contention that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment constrains the power of state governments to accuse a citizen of
an infamous crime." Id. at 316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the claim is adequately covered under another constitutional
30 9
amendment.
V.

TREATMENT

BY

LowER

FEDERAL

CouRT

OF

MALICIOUS PROSECUT[ON CASES IN THE AFTmEiATH
OF ALBRiGHT

A. The Lower Courts

The circuits were in conflict pre-Albright and remain so postAlbright. The general quandary is exemplified by the conflicting
decisions even within some circuits since the Supreme Court's
decision in Albright. 310 One court noted that "in many ways

311
Albright muddied the waters rather than clarified them."
In the wake of Albright, the First Circuit held that a malicious
prosecution claim based upon substantive due process is no longer

available under Section 1983."' Prior First Circuit decisions
limited reliance on substantive due process in malicious

prosecution claims. 13 Under Torres, a Section 1983 malicious
prosecution claim based upon a substantive due process
deprivation must have alleged "conscience shocking" conduct by
the defendant.314 However, since Albright, this standard is no

3Id.
at 275.
310 See generally

1A MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JoHN E. KIRKLII, SECTION
1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (3d ed. 1997). Compare Singer v.
Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that while
common law tort actions may parallel constitutional claims, "it is only the
violation of the constitutional right that is actionable and compensable under
Section 1983") with Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
that "though Section 1983 provides the federal claim, we borrow the elements
of the underlying malicious prosecution tort from state law.").
31 Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 n.5 (10th Cir. 1996).
312 See, e.g., Roche v. John Hancock Mutual Life insurance Company, 81
F.3d 249 (1st Cir. 1996); Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40 (Ist Cir.
1994).
"' Torres v. Superintendent of Police of Puerto Rico, 893 F.2d 404 (1st Cir.
1990).
314 Id. at 410.
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longer applicable. 15 In Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen,36 the First
Circuit ruled that "Albright would appear virtually to foreclose
reliance on substantive due process as the basis for a viable

malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 - superseding
even Torres' very limited tolerance of reliance on substantive due
process in this area."31 7 Additionally, the Court held that a
Section 1983 procedural due process claim is not available unless
there are no adequate state remedies.318 Similarly, in Roche v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,3 9 the First Circuit addressed
311See,

e.g., Perez-Ruiz, 25 F.3d at 42. But see Hall v. Gonfrade, 36 F.3d

1089 (Table) 1994 WL 527165 (1st Cit. Sept. 29, 1994). In Hall, an
unpublished opinion, the Court applied pre-Albright analysis. Id. at *2. The
court stated that in order to state a claim for malicious prosecution based upon
substantive due process, an individual must allege "conscience shocking"
conduct. Id. However, the court noted that Albright appears "to foreclose
reliance on substantive due process as a basis for a viable malicious
prosecution claim under section 1983." Id. at *3 n.4. (citations omitted).
316 25 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 1994). In Perez-Ruiz, two individuals, Perez and
Lopez, were arrested on separate incidents and charged with the crime of
selling cocaine. Id. at 41. After Perez was acquitted and the charges against
Lopez were dropped, they brought § 1983 claims against various officials and
officers of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico asserting various claims,
including malicious prosecution. Id. Perez and Lopez complained of a large
conspiracy against them. Id. Relying on Torres, the district court rejected the
malicious prosecution claim, reasoning that plaintiff's had failed to assert
conduct that could be characterized as "conscience shocking." Id. (citations
omitted). The First Circuit affirmed, supporting its conclusion with the
Albright
decision. Id.
3 17
Id. at 42.
38 Id. at 42-43. In Perez-Ruiz, the court rejected appellants procedural due
process claim reasoning that the law in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
provided appellants with an adequate state remedy. Id. at 43.
9 81 F.3d 249 (1st Cir. 1996). In Roche, a former employee brought a
malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 against his former employer after his
employer submitted information to authorities regarding allegations of
suspected wrongdoing by the employee. Id. at 252-53. In 1991, John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. fired about 450 workers including Daniel J.
Roche. Id. at 251. A day later a senior vice-president began receiving
threatening phone calls. Id. The police investigation led nowhere and Roche
was rehired in February, 1992. Id. Thereafter, in March, 1992, the
anonymous phone calls resumed Id. Several people along with a voice
analysis firm identified the caller's voice as that of Roche's. Id. Relying on
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the availability of Section 1983 to remedy a claim for malicious
prosecution.32
The First Circuit held that "there is no
substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
be free from malicious prosecution." 321 The Court noted that
Albright left unresolved whether such a claim would be available
under the Fourth Amendment."
After Albright, it was unclear in the Third Circuit whether a
malicious prosecution claim, even under the Fourth Amendment,
was viable.3 Prior to Albright the Third Circuit had what was
termed as the "most expansive approach" to such claims. 3'

The

impact of Albright upon Third Circuit jurisprudence was unclear
and the district courts had no clear direction from the Third

Circuit.32' However, in Gallo v. City of Phiadelphia,3' the
this information, the police procured a warrant for Roche's arrest. Id. at 252.
Roche was later charged with threatening to murder the vice-president,
threatening to harm his family, and making harassing calls. Id. After the jury
acquitted, Roche brought a civil rights suit. Id. at 253.
30Id. at 256.
321

Id.

' Id. at 256 n.5. Nevertheless, the court did not address any Fourth
Amendment claim, characterizing it as "virgin territory." Id. The Court
noted that "[e]ven assuming the vitality of such an approach, the existence of
probable cause vitiates any arguable Fourth Amendment claim." Id.
3
nSee Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809 (1994).
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270 n.4 (1994).
See, e.g., Smith v. Holtz, 856 F. Supp. 227, 236 (M.D. Pa. 1994)
(noting in dicta that the issue was still unresolved; whether a malicious
prosecution claim could exist under the Fourth Amendment); Miller v. City of
Philadelphia, 954 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (discussing how
Albright failed to provide the courts with clear guidance and citing district
court decisions reaching results on both sides of the issue. See also Barna v.
City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809 (1994). In Barna, the plaintiffs appealed
the granting of summary judgment on their Section 1983 false arrest claims
brought against police officers. Id. at 812. Plaintiffs also argued that their
complaint contained a claim for malicious prosecution. Id. at 812, n.2. The
Third Circuit concluded that the malicious prosecution claim was not submitted
to the district court and therefore, not properly before the Court of Appeals.
Id. at 812. The court avoided addressing Albright, noting "we have no
occasion to consider what effect the Supreme Court's decision in
Albright... has on our circuit jurisprudence." Id. See also Hilfirty v.
Shipman, 91 F.3d 573 (3d Cir. 1996). In Hilfirty, the Third Circuit ignored
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Third Circuit, addressing a malicious prosecution claim brought
under Section 1983, discussed the impact of Albright. Relying on
Albright and Singer v. Fulton,327 the Third Circuit held that a

plaintiff asserting a claim for malicious prosecution must show
"some deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of
'seizure.'

328

Adopting Justice Ginsburg's "continued seizure"
theory, the court held that intentional restrictions imposed on
Gallos' liberty, including travel restrictions and mandatory court
appearances over an eight and a half-month period, qualified as a
seizure.

329

Albright and reinstated the analysis of malicious prosecution that had existed
prior to Albright. Id. at 579. The opinion failed to discuss Albright or the
applicable constitutional provisions from which the malicious prosecution
claim derives. Id. The court stated that in order to state a prima facie claim
for malicious prosecution under Section 1983, a plaintiff "must establish the
element of the common law tort as it developed over time." Id. at 575. The
Third Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the grant of
nolle prosequi was not a favorable termination of the criminal proceedings
reasoning as follows:
Where a party authorizes her co-defendant to enter into a
compromise agreement providing for the dismissal of her criminal
charges and she offers no consideration in exchange for such
dismissal, she will not have been found to have relinquished her
right to file a malicious prosecution claim unless it is plain from the
record of a hearing in open court or a written release-dismissal
agreement that such relinquishment was knowing, intentional and
voluntary.
Id. at 583-84. The court concluded that the grant of nolle prosequi did not
deprive Miller of the right to pursue her malicious prosecution claim. Id. at
584-85.
326161 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998). Following acquittal on charges of arson,
Gallo brought a § 1983 action against the officials who were responsible for
investigating his case, alleging malicious prosecution. Id. at 218.
32763 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1995). For a detail discussion of Singer, see infra
notes 416-437 and accompanying text.
321Gallo, 161 F.3d at 222.
329Id. at 225. See also Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 1998)
(holding that a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution may be based on
constitutional provisions other than the Fourth Amendment.) The Torres
court, however, found that a post-conviction incarceration was not a seizure
with in the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 174.
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The Fourth Circuit held that under Albright, the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive due process protection does not afford
an individual a remedy for malicious prosecution without
probable cause.33 Several cases which have addressed the issue
have recognized that under some circumstances the Fourth
Amendment guarantees that an individual has the right to be free
from malicious prosecution. 331 In Wilkes v. Young, the Fourth
Circuit held that a claim alleging that an individual was
prosecuted in the absence of probable cause "can only be judged
upon the Fourth Amendment." 332 However, in that case, the
Fourth Circuit found no violation of the Fourth Amendment.33
In Ikes, the plaintiff brought a Section 1983 claim arising from
her arrest for failure to appear in Magistrate's Court.3'
3 Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the Fourteenth Amendment fails to provide substantive due process
protection in the area of malicious prosecution); Wilkes v. Young, 28 F.3d
1362, 1364 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994) (following Albright's holding that an individual
contending malicious prosecution without probable cause has no claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
33 Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (1997); Brooks v. City of WinstonSalem, 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996); Wilkes v. Young, 28 F.3d 1362 (4th Cir.
1994).
m Wilkes, 28 F.3d at 1364 n.2.
mId. at 1363.

' Id. In Wilkes, Gloria Wilkes' car was ticketed when her daughter illegally
parked Wilkes' car in a fire lane in front of the Florence County Public
Services Building. Id. As a result of the summons, Wilkes was required to
appear in magistrate court. Id. When Wilkes failed to appear in court, the
magistrate instructed LeGrand Young, an employee of the Florence County
Building and Grounds Department, to prepare an affidavit. Id. at 1363-63.
The affidavit stated that Wilkes had failed to report to court as required by the
ticket that she received for illegally parking in a fire lane. Id. Thereafter,
Wilkes was arrested under a warrant charging her with a state criminal offense
of "willful failure to appear in Magistrate Court following arrest and release."
Id. at 1368 (Phillips, ., dissenting). The basis of the warrant was the affidavit
which contained several misleading statements, including the fact that Wilkes
had been properly served with the summons to appear in Magistrate Court.
Id. (Phillips, . dissenting). Wilkes, a grandmother, was fingerprinted,
photographed and detained for several hours, during which she "suffered
humiliation from the taunts of fellow inmates and significant physical harm
resulting from the exacerbation of preexisting diabetic and coronary
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Specifically, plaintiff argued that her Fourth Amendment rights
were violated when an allegedly false affidavit was submitted in
support of the warrant for her arrest.335 The Court held that
plaintiff had failed to prove a Fourth Amendment violation,
reasoning that a misleading statement contained in an affidavit
does

not establish a violation of an individual's Fourth

Amendment rights "unless the statement is 'necessary to the
finding of probable cause.'

336

The court concluded that the

evidence, including the uncontroverted
facts set forth in the
337
affidavit, established probable cause.

In Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 338 the Fourth Circuit ruled
that allegations that a police officer's seizure "pursuant to legal
process was not supported by probable cause and that the criminal
proceedings terminated in his favor are sufficient to state a
Section 1983 for malicious prosecution claim 39alleging a seizure
that was violative of the Fourth Amendment."
In order to prevail on a Section 1983 claim of malicious

prosecution, the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff must establish a
violation of Fourth Amendment rights. 34" Additionally, malicious
conditions." Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting). Ultimately, the charges against her
were dismissed. Id. at 1364.
33
Id. at 1364.
336
Id. at 1365 (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978)).
SId. In his dissent, Justice Phillips opined:
[t]his case provides a prime example of a law-abiding citizen's being
left at the mercy of low-level official caprice, callous inattention,
and deliberate indifference by a judicial willingness to relax the
fundamental requirements, apparently out of some overriding sense
that there simply is not that much at stake here - either for this
plaintiff or for the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 1376 (Phillips, J. dissenting).
33'
85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996).
331
Id. at 183-84. Larry Jerome Brooks was arrested and prosecuted on state
criminal charges, including rape and kidnapping. Id. at 180.
Brooks
proclaimed his innocence and offered to submit to DNA and polygraph testing.
id. Ultimately, the charges against Brooks were dropped. Id. Three years
later Brooks filed a § 1983 claim alleging violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.
3'0Johnson v. Louisiana Dep't of Agriculture, 18 F.3d 318, 320 (5th Cir.
1994).
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prosecution claims under Section 1983 are considered under the
Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard. 34 In Johnson
v. Louisiana Dep't of Agriculture,

the Fifth Circuit avoided

confronting Aibright where a plaintiff failed to satisfy an element
of the common law tort of malicious prosecution. 3 In Johnson,
the court addressed a claim for malicious prosecution in violation
of the First Amendment.' The court determined that it was "far
from clear" whether the Constitution recognizes any such
claim. 5 Therefore, the court held that in order to prevail on this
type of claim an individual must, "at the very least," allege a
deprivation of a constitutional right and establish that all of the
elements of the common law tort have been satisfied.' As the
plaintiff had failed to prove that the underlying criminal
proceeding had terminated in his favor, the court did not address
the issue.' 4 The court noted that Aibright "casts a shadow on all
prior cases" in the circuit which deal with malicious prosecution
claims.'
3' Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1994).

18 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 1994)
Id. at 320-21.
' Id. at 320. Johnson involved a civil rights action brought by Donald

34

343

Johnson, a crop duster, against Louisiana state officials who allegedly
sanctioned him several times and eventually revoked his license and
certification to apply pesticides. Id. at 319-20. Johnson argued that the
Department of Agriculture continuously sanctioned him beause he refused to

give a large enough contribution to the Agricultural Commissioner's reelection
campaign.

Id. at 320.

Moreover, Johnson claimed that the department

fabricated illegal evidence against him in order to facilitate adjudicating him
guilty of violating Louisiana pesticide laws. Id. at 319. As a result of the
increasingly severe penalties against him, Johnson's cropdusting career ended.
Id. at 319-20.
3 Id.

Id.

Id. at 321. After the charges were brought against him, The Louisiana
Advisory Committee on Pesticide held hearings on several occasions and
recommended that penalties be assessed against Johnson.
Id. at 319.
Thereafter, Johnson "appealed five of his administrative penalties and four
ended in a decrease in punishment." Id. at 321. Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit refused to recognize Johnson's claim because "none of the appeals
ended with a finding of not guilty." Id.
3" Id. at 321 n.2.
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In Brothers v. Klevenhagen,349 the Fifth Circuit held that "a
pretrial detainee receives the protection of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 35 0 In a footnote, the court
distinguished the facts in Albrigh s" and further commented that
"that portion of Albright that suggests that the Fourth Amendment

applies to pretrial deprivations of liberty did not receive the
support of a majority of the Justices. "352
In Eugene v. Alief,353 the Fifth Circuit attempted to clarify
Albright when it held that a malicious prosecution claim based

upon an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment was a viable
cause of action .3' The court interpreted Aibright as rejecting
reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment for pre-trial deprivations,
such as malicious prosecution.355 Further, in Morin v. Caire,356
the Fifth Circuit addressed a claim arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment and stated that "the Supreme Court has recently
determined that there is no substantive due process right to
be
upon probable cause." 357

free from criminal prosecution except

349 28 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1994). In Brothers, family members of a felony
suspect who was shot and killed while attempting to escape from custody, filed
suit against the county and its sheriff alleging excessive force and a violation of
§ 1983. Id. at 454.
-5o Id. at 455-56 (citing Valencia v. Wiggens, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir.
1993)).
351 Id. at 456 n.3.
"Albright was an individual complaining of an arrest
warrant and prosecution without probable cause. That scenario is far different
from a pretrial detainee escaping from custody." Id.
352 id.
353 65 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1995). Eugene involved a parent who alleged that
the school district that her son attended violated her civil rights after a security
guard at the school arrested her. Id. at 1302.
354 Id. at 1303-04.
31 Id. at 1303.
356 77 F.3d 116 (5th Cir. 1996). In Morin, plaintiffs remained in prison for
21 months in connection with the homicide of one of their partners. Id. at
119. Ultimately, the charges were dropped and plaintiffs brought a federal
civil rights action against the arresting officer. Id. In their complaint,
plaintiffs allege violations of their rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment together with state law tort claims of malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment and abuse of process. Id.
"57Id. at 120 (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss4/26

56

Schonfeld: Malicious Prosecution

1999

MALICIO US PROSECUTION

1737

Since Albright, the Sixth Circuit has recognized a Section 1983
claim for malicious prosecution alleging violations of the Fourth

Amendment."'

The Sixth Circuit addressed the question in

Moore v. Hayes."5 9 In Moore, the plaintiff's Section 1983 claim

alleged malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment." 6
The court considered potential
testimony which would have established probable cause and
affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Section 1983

claim for malicious prosecution.36 The court reasoned that
Albright held that such a claim must be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment and must allege "either the absence of probable
cause or specific instances of prosecutorial misconduct which, if
proven, would negate probable cause." "
Following Albright, the Seventh Circuit in Smart v. Board of
Trustees of University of Illinois,36 recognized a federal claim for
malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. 3" The
Seventh Circuit, interpreting the Albright decision, stated that if
malicious prosecution or abuse of process is committed
by state actors and results in the arrest or other seizure
3 See Smith v. Williams, 78 F.3d 585 (table), 1996 WL 99329 (6th Cir.
1996). In Smith, the Sixth Circuit rejected plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment
claim for malicious prosecution, but recognized plaintiff's Fourth Amendment
claim. Id. at *4-5. The court acknowledged that prior to Albright the Sixth
Circuit had recognized substantive due process claims for malicious
prosecution. Id. at *4.However, the court recognized that Albright held that
such a claim must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. See also Donavan v. Thames, 105 F.3d 291
(6th Cir. 1997) (discussing Albright and noting that under Kentucky law, "a
claim for warrantless arrest without probable cause cannot be brought as a
malicious prosecution claim.").
3" 83 F.3d 422 (table), 1996 WL 200282 (6th Cir. 1996).
3 Id. at *2.
3' Id. at *4.
MId.

34 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 1994). Smart involved a § 1983 claim brought by
an unsuccessful applicant for an academic position with a state university,
alleging that the university funded a lawsuit brought against him for
defamation, thereby infringing upon his freedom of speech. Id. at 433.
S d. at 434.
3
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of the defendant, there is an infringement of liberty, but
we now know that the defendant's only constitutional
remedy is under the Fourth Amendment (as made

applicable to the states by the Fourteenth), and not under
the due process clause directly.365
In Esmail v. Macrane,366 the Seventh Circuit explained that to

state a claim for malicious prosecution under Section 1983
plaintiff must prove that "the action taken by the state, whether in
form of prosecution or otherwise, was a spiteful effort to 'get'
him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state
objective." 367 In Reed v. City of Chicago,368 the Seventh Circuit
avoided a "struggle with Albright" and dismissed plaintiff's

malicious prosecution claim. 369 Finding no claim for malicious
' Id. (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)).
'6
53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995). In Esmail, the plaintiff, the owner of a
liquor store in Illinois, claimed a violation of his equal protection rights after
he had been harassed by the mayor. Id. at 177. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant repeatedly attempted to deny him his liquor licenses and caused the
police to harass him. Id. While the plaintiff did not pursue a First
Amendment retaliation claim, he did challenge the mayor's actions as a denial
of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Id. at 178.
" Id. at 180. In an opinion authored by Judge Richard Posner, the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged the plaintiff's § 1983 claim as arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The court determined that plaintiff's case was
not the common type of equal protection case. Id. at 178. Nevertheless, the
court concluded that unequal treatment does not necessarily violate equal
protection except "where the decision to prosecute is made either in retaliation
for the exercise of a constitutional right." Id. at 179.
'6' 77 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 1996). Reed involved a § 1983 claim brought by
an arrestee who had been indicted on first degree murder charges and held for
approximately 23 months until his acquittal. Id. at 1050. Plaintiff sued the
City of Chicago and certain police detectives, alleging that he was arrested and
detained without probable cause. Id. at 1051.
" Id. at 1053 (holding that the lower court dismissed plaintiffs malicious
prosecution claim because he "failed to maneuver around the Albright
minefield."). It should be noted that the court recognized a federal malicious
prosecution claim. Id. at 1051. The court stated "[t]o state a claim for
malicious prosecution under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1)
he has satisfied the requirements of a state law cause of action for malicious
prosecution; (2) the malicious prosecution was committed by state actors; and
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prosecution, the court reasoned that plaintiff had failed to allege
that the detectives committed any type of improper acts, such as
withholding exculpatory evidence of perjured testimony, after
arresting him without probable cause."' 0 In a similar case,
Washington v. Summerville, 37' the Seventh Circuit held that an
individual asserting a claim for malicious prosecution under
Section 1983 must "first clear the preliminary hurdle" of stating a
cognizable violation of federal law.2
Recently, in Sneed v. Rybicki,3" the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim brought
under Section 1983. 374 Plaintiff was arrested and convicted for
first degree murder.375 Ultimately, the conviction was reversed
and the charges against him were dismissed. 376 Plaintiff sued
under Section 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution.' m
In concluding that plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action for
malicious prosecution, the court discussed the distinction between
false arrest claims and malicious prosecution claims. 3'
Both
(3) he was deprived of liberty." Id. (citing Smart v. Board of Trustees of
University of Illinois, 34 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 1994)).
m Id. at 1053. "It is conceivable that a wrongful arrest could be the first
step towards a malicious prosecution. However, the chain of causation is
broken by an indictment, absent an allegation of pressure or influence exerted
by the police officers, or knowing misstatements made by the officers to the
prosecutor." Id. at 1053. See also Sneed v. Rybicki, 146 F.3d 478 (7th Cir.
1998); Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251 (7th Cir. 1997).
371 127 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1997). In Washington, an arrestee filed a § 1983
claim after the State Attorney's no!!e porsequi's motion was entered in an
underlying murder prosecution. Id. at 554.
m Id. at 599. The court found that the accused did not have a cognizable
federal malicious prosecution claim. Id.
3
146 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 1998).
374
Id. at 482.
375
Id. at 480.
376 Id. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed plaintiff's conviction and
remanded because there was no probable cause for the arrest. Id.
Id. The district court dismissed the § 1983 false arrest claim as barred by
the two year statute of limitations. Id. The district court dismissed the § 1983
malicious prosecution claim for failure to state a cause of action. Id. On
appeal, plaintiff only contested the dismissal of the malicious prosecution
claim. Id.
3Id.
at 481.
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claims have the same two-year statute of limitations, which
begins to run when all of the elements of the claim can be
pleaded.3 79 However, a false arrest claim begins to run the day of

the arrest, while a malicious prosecution claim does not begin to
run until the criminal proceedings are terminated in favor of the
plaintiff.8 0 The court explained that "a plaintiff whose false
arrest claim is time-barred may well still have a viable claim for
malicious prosecution, but he must plead malicious prosecution
instead of using that label to navigate around the statute of
limitations."381 The court concluded that plaintiff had failed to
allege any improper acts or wrongdoing after his arrest. 312 His
blanket statement that he was maliciously prosecuted was
insufficient to state a claim for malicious prosecution under
Section 1983.
The Ninth Circuit continues to adhere to its pre-Albright
analysis. In Haupt v. Dillard,383 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's federal malicious
prosecution claim. 3 4 The court reiterated the standard set forth
by the district court and concluded that to state a claim for
malicious prosecution under Section 1983, plaintiff must prove
both a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right together
with all of the elements of the state tort law. 3 5 However, the
court did not address the malicious prosecution claim because
379
Id.
3 id.
311 Id.

Therefore, an individual who "alleges only that he was arrested and

detained without probable cause has only pled false arrest." Id. A plaintiff
must allege "some action that supports the conclusion that a malicious
prosecution occurred." Id.
31 Id. The court reasoned that plaintiff had not "alleged that 'detectives gave
perjured testimony,* or 'falsified any information or evidence'... [n]or did he
allege that police withheld exculpatory evidence." 1d.
33 17 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1994). In Haupt, plaintiff, a criminal defendant
who was acquitted on charges of kidnapping and murder, brought an action in
federal court under § 1983 claim. Id. at 287. Plaintiff's claim included
malicious prosecution, unreasonable search and seizure, and right to a fair and
impartial trial. Id.
384 Id. at 290.
385 Id.
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plaintiff had failed to satisfy the requisite elements of the state
tort, specifically, lack of probable cause." 6 Citing the Albright
decision, the court noted that the constitutional foundation for a
malicious prosecution claim brought under Section 1983 "is a
matter of dispute."3 17 In Freeman v. Cyty of Santa Anna,3ss the
Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim
without discussing Albright.319 The court relied on pre-Albright

decisions when it stated that a claim for malicious prosecution
may exist when the plaintiff proves "that the defendants
prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that
they did so for the purpose of denying
her equal protection or
3M
right."
another specific constitutional
The Tenth Circuit recognizes Section 1983 claims based upon
malicious prosecution.39' Prior to Albright, the Tenth Circuit had
not been consistent on this issue. While some decisions required
only the common law element of malicious prosecution, others
required "egregious misuse of legal procedure." 3M

However,

msId.
3Id. at 290 n.4.
" 68 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1995). Freeman involved a suit brought by a
bar/restaurant owner against the City of Santa Anna, California and several
police officers, for alleged constitutional violations. Id. at 1184. Plaintiff
alleged that her bar/restaurant was subjected to discriminatory and unfair
enforcement efforts by the police officers. Id.
33 Id. at 1189.
390 Id. (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985) (en bane);
Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1981)). The court found that plaintiff
had not satisfied this burden because she was unable to prove lack of probable
cause. Id. See also Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1981). In Cline,
the Ninth Circuit held:
The general rule is that malicious prosecution does not constitute a
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law
and, therefore, is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
However, an exception to this rule exists for malicious prosecution
conducted with the intent of denying a person equal protection or
which otherwise subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights.
Id. at 112 (citations omitted).
'9' See, e.g., Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556 (10th Cir. 1996); Wolford
v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484 (10th Cir. 1996).
311Compare Anthony v. Baker, 767 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1985) with Robinson
v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1990).
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since Albright, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that a claim for

malicious prosecution under Section 1983 does not "implicate"
substantive due process. 93 As the Tenth Circuit stated in Taylor
v.

Meacham,3 94 the

common

law elements

of malicious

prosecution are the "starting point" for the court's analysis of a
malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983, but ultimately,
the plaintiff must prove a constitutional violation. 95 In Taylor,
the court affirmed

the dismissal

of plaintiff's

malicious

prosecution claim under Section 1983, finding no constitutional

393 Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that a § 1983 claim may be brought against County government
for malicious prosecution if the prosecution involves a constitutional violation).
Nevertheless, the court noted that "Albright muddied the waters rather than
clarified them." Id. at 1561 n.5.
314 82 F.3d 1556 (10th Cir. 1996). In Taylor, plaintiff was arrested and
charged with first degree murder. Id. at 1558. After DNA results from
evidence found at the scene of the crime did not match plaintiffs DNA, the
charges were dropped against him. Id. at 1559. Thereafter, plaintiff brought
a § 1983 claim for wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution, alleging that his
wrongful arrest and detention "constituted an unreasonable seizure and
deprivation of his liberty, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 1558. Plaintiff argued lack of probable cause and that
the decision to charge him with the twenty year old murder was done with
"reckless disregard of the actual facts and included willful misstatements of
facts and lies to individuals who were interviewed." Id. at 1559.
'95 Id. at 1561. The court concluded:
[O]ur circuit takes the common law elements of malicious
prosecution as the 'starting point' for the analysis of a § 1983
malicious prosecution claim but always reaches the ultimate
question, which it must, of whether the plaintiff has proven a
constitutional violation ... that right is the Fourth Amendment's
right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
Id. See also Gaschler v. Scott County, Kansas, 141 F.3d 1184 (Table), 1998
WL 161045 (10th Cir. Kan.) (affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs claim for
malicious prosecution brought under § 1983 because plaintiff was unable to
prove that the defendants acted with malice and without probable cause); Klein
v. Coblentz, 132 F.3d 42 (Table), 1997 WL 767538 (10th Cir. Colo.) (stating
that in order to maintain a malicious prosecution claim brought pursuant to
§ 1983, plaintiff must allege "facts tending to prove the common law elements
of malicious prosecution and that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizure has been violated.").
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violation. 396 In Wolford v. Lasater,39 7 the Tenth Circuit held that
a claim of malicious prosecution brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment was not viable. 3'
Although, the Tenth Circuit
recognized plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim brought under
the Fourth Amendment,9 the court, nevertheless, dismissed the
Fourth Amendment claim.4°
In Tinney v. Shores, °1 the Eleventh Circuit cast doubt on the
availability of a malicious prosecution claim brought under
Section 1983 for violations of substantive and procedural due
process. 4°' However, in Whiting v. Taylor,' the Eleventh
Circuit recognized a Section 1983 claim for a malicious
prosecution claim in violation of the Fourth Amendment.4 In
Whiting, plaintiff, a boat owner, brought a Section 1983 claim
against Marine patrol officers after the officers seized his boat for
failing to display registration decals, obtained a warrant for his
arrest on the charge of "obstructing officers without violence"
and thereafter arrested him again.' Plaintiff alleged that he was
396 Id. at 1563.

The court reasoned that any inaccuracies contained on the
arrest warrant along with any information that may have been omitted, would
not have changed the determination that probable cause existed. Id. at 1562.
39' 78 F.3d 484 (10th Cir.1996). In Wolford, a former secretary for the
Sheriff of San Juan County was arrested and charged with embezzling county
funds and forging the former sheriff's signature. Id. at 486-87. Following her
acquittal on both of the charges, she filed a § 1983 action against several
county officials alleging that she had been arrested unconstitutionally and
charged without probable cause in retaliation for supporting the former sheriff
and
filing notice of tort claim. Id. at 487.
3
11Id. at 489-90.
39 Id. at 489.
' Id. The court reasoned that the affidavit submitted in support of the arrest
warrant contained adequate facts to "demonstrate a substantial probability that
plaintiff committed" the crimes of forgery, intent to defraud and embezzlement
and that any false testimony provided to the grand jury was not material to the
probable cause determination. Id.
40177 F.3d 378 (11th Cir. 1996).
42"Id. at 381.
385 F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 1996).
44ld. at 586.
' Id. at 583. Some of the charges against plaintiff were nol prossed by the
state attorney and the others were dismissed by the state court judge. Id. In
his order, the state court judge found that plaintiff had been harassed by the
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"maliciously prosecuted in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights."

40 6

The court held that

"no independent Fourth

Amendment right exists to be free from malicious
prosecution. 407 The court also noted that "referring to a federal
'right' to be free from malicious prosecution is actually a
description of the right to be free from an unlawful seizure which
is part of a prosecution." 4 8 The court concluded that plaintiff

had in fact stated three possible unlawful seizures which properly
formed the basis for a claim brought under Section 1983.409

B. Malicious ProsecutionDevelopments in the Second Circuit
"Second Circuit decisional law provides an instructive
example
410
Albright."
of
light
in
of the need for reevaluation
Prior to Albright, the Second Circuit recognized malicious

prosecution claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 for
deprivation

of the

Fourteenth

Amendment

due

process

defendants and prosecuting attorney through "gross incompetence or by
intention." Id.
4
Id. at 584. Plaintiff believed that the marine officials made false
statements on a citation and arrest affidavits, falsified public records,
backdated documents and kept or destroyed or caused to be destroyed
plaintiffs personal property. Id. at 583.
' Id. at 584. In a footnote, the court referred to Albright's holding that "no
'substantive' due process exists to be free from a malicious prosecution." Id.
at 584 n.3. However, the court also noted that Albright "left open the question
of whether such a claim could be based on the Fourth Amendment or the due
process clause's procedural component." Id.
' Id. at 584 n.4. Therefore, the court determined that plaintiff could avoid
a dismissal of his claim if he based it "on some actual unlawful, forcible,
restraint of his person." Id. at 584.
9 Id. The three possible unlawful seizures alleged by the plaintiff included
"his surrender following the issuance of the arrest warrant, his arrest as he left
the courtroom, and his being required to appear to answer the charges after
being released on bond." Id.
410 1A MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983
LrrIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 3.20 at 322 (3d ed. 1997).
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guarantees. 41' The Second Circuit held that the common-law
elements of the state tort of malicious prosecution give rise to a
constitutional claim brought under Section 1983.412 Following the
Supreme Court's decision in Albright, the Second Circuit
continued to adhere to the view that the elements of the
constitutional tort analogous to malicious prosecution would be
borrowed from the state law cause of action. 13
In Cook v. Sheldon,41 4 decided several months after the
Supreme Court's decision in Albright, the Second Circuit was
faced with its first major malicious prosecution case. In Cook,
the plaintiff alleged that state troopers had arranged a fraudulent
arraignment and thereafter allowed him to remain in prison to
exact retribution. 4 5 After the charges against him were dropped,
plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action in federal court alleging
"false arrest, malicious prosecution, and malicious abuse of
process."416 Affirming the dismissal of defendant's motion for
summary judgement, the court held that the malicious prosecution
claim alleged a violation of plaintiff's established federal rights. 1 7
411

See, e.g., Singleton v. New York, 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980); White v.

Frank, 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988).
4"2 See,

e.g., Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1992); Raysor v. Port

Authority of New York and New Jersey, 768 F.2d (Cir. 1985). Under New

York law, the elements of a claim for malicious prosecution include: (1) the
commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding, (2) the termination of

that proceeding in favor of the plaintiff, (3) the absence of probable cause for
the criminal proceeding, and (4) actual malice. Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73,

79 (2d Cir. 1994).
413

See Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Section 1983 liability

may... be anchored in a claim for malicious prosecution, as this tort
'typically implicates constitutional rights secured by the fourteenth amendment,
such as deprivation of liberty.") (citations omitted).

414 41 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1994).
41
1 Id. at 75. Plaintiff was charged with illegal possession of a car without a
Vehicle Identification Number, a felony under New York law. Id. at 76.
416 Id. at 77.
Plaintiff argued that "the Troopers arrested him without
probable cause" because they were "outraged" that he should advise his
friend, who was also being interrogated, to remain silent and request the
assistance of an attorney. Id.
417
Id. at 79. Defendants argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity
because they had probable cause to effectuate plaintiff's arrest. Id. at 75.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999

65

Touro Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 4 [1999], Art. 26

1746

TO URO LA W REVIEW

[Vol 15

Totally disregarding Aibright, the Second Circuit relied on state
41 8
tort law to find the elements of malicious prosecution.
Furthermore, the court recognized malicious abuse of criminal

process as actionable under Section 1983, relying on state law to
define the specific elements of such -a claim. 4 19

The court

reasoned that:
The torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process

are closely allied. While malicious prosecution concerns
the improper issuance of process, '[t]he gist of abuse of
process is the improper use of process after it is
regularly

issued.' ...

Since

this

circuit

already

recognizes malicious prosecution claims under section
1983... it should extend that recognition to the tort's
close cousin, abuse of criminal process.420
Shortly thereafter in Pinaud v. County of Suffolk,421 the Second

Circuit once again presumed that the pre-Albright decisions were
controlling. 422 In Pinaud, plaintiff served a 28-month prison
sentence for a state conviction for which the charges against him
were eventually dismissed. 4' Thereafter, plaintiff brought a civil
rights action against the district attorneys alleging, among other
4 Id.at 79. "Though Section 1983 provides the federal claim, we borrow
the elements of the underlying malicious prosecution tort from state law." Id.
(citing Raysor v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 768 F.2d 34,
39 (2d Cir. 1985)). The court found that plaintiff had demonstrated all of the
elements of the tort: "(1) The Troopers had commenced a criminal proceeding
against him .. . (2) the proceedings ended in the plaintiff's favor, (3) the
defendant did not have probable cause to believe plaintiff was guilty ...and
(4) the defendant acted with actual malice." Id.
419 Id. at 80. The question of whether the Second Circuit would recognize
the tort of malicious abuse of criminal process was one of first impression. Id.
at 79.
41 Id. at 80 (citations omitted).
42,52 F.3d 1139 (2d Cir. 1995).
422
Id. at 1154.
2 Id. at 1143. Plaintiff was led to believe that "when he pleaded guilty to
this state charge that a contemporaneous federal sentence would be reduced by
828 days that he ultimately served on the vacated state conviction, [plaintiff]
was in fact denied any federal credit for that time." Id.
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Admitting its reluctance to

confront Albright, the Second Circuit found that plaintiff failed to
state a claim for malicious prosecution because plaintiff had not
satisfied the pre-Albright requirements for malicious
prosecution. 4z In its attempt to avoid confrontation with Albright
the court stated:
Tempted as we are to try to clarify the law in this area in
the wake of the many questions left unanswered by the
Supreme Court's fragmented ruling in Albright, we
nonetheless conclude that this is not the case in which to
struggle with the meaning of Albright. The District
Court found that Pinaud had not stated a claim under our
pre-Albright malicious prosecution decisions. And the
parties have not discussed Albright at all and therefore
seem to assume that our pre-Albright decisions are
controlling in this case. Under these circumstances,
given that no claim has been made that any of the preAlbright requirements for a malicious prosecution claim
that are involved here have been eliminated by Albright,
we think it appropriate to await another case - one in
which the parties have addressed the impact of AIbright
and in which the issue is necessarily determinative - to
explore that case's effect on Section 1983 malicious
prosecution claims.Y
The Second Circuit took its first stab at developing the
principles set forth in Albright in Singer v. Fulton County
Shefiff.427 In Singer, the Second Circuit, in interpreting AIbright,

recognized that "the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive
Plaintiff claimed that "his travails were the result of an 'out-of-court1
ploy among a group of district attorneys for the County of Suffolk." Id.
4 Id. at 1154. The court held that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for
malicious prosecution because "the dismissal of the charges against him 'was
not indicative of his innocence and therefore was not a favorable termination'
under New York law." Id. (citations omitted).
44Id.

'Id. (footnote omitted).
427 63 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1995).
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due process will not support a federal claim for malicious
prosecution; however, Aibright does not bar [plaintiff] from
asserting a federal claim for malicious prosecution under the
Fourth Amendment., 42 In Singer, the plaintiff Daniel Singer,
was employed by the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation as a ranger.429 In October, 1991, on
his way to join a local search and rescue party,4 30 Singer stopped
at a local convenience shop to get supplies.431 Singer gave the
clerk a list of products that he was taking and advised him that he

would return after the search to pay for items taken. 432 The clerk
claimed that he never consented to the arrangement.433

Shortly

thereafter, Singer was arrested and charged with petit larceny.434
The charges against Singer were later dismissed. 5 Singer then
filed an action in federal district court alleging malicious

prosecution, conspiracy to violate civil rights, and false arrest

42

Id. at 114.

Id. at 112. Additionally, Singer was involved in local politics and was
characterized as having the "ability to influence public opinion." Id. He
published a local newsletter called The Northville Free Press, which provided
Singer with a forum to criticize the local village government. Id. The
newsletter was free of charge and available at local shops, including Stewart's
Ice Cream Shop. Id.
" The search party was formed to search for a missing hunter. Id.
411 Id. at 113. Singer drove to Stewart's Ice Cream Shop to get the food
supplies. Id.
432 Id. The total worth of the merchandise taken by Singer was $11.55,
which consisted of bread, ham, cheese and pepperoni. Id. at 113 n.2.
" Id. at 113. After Singer left the shop, the store clerk telephoned the store
manager to inform her that Singer left the shop without paying for
merchandise. Id. Two hours later, the Deputy Sheriff arrived at the shop,
where he interviewed the store clerk and store manager and had the store clerk
sign an information alleging that Singer stole merchandise from the shop. Id.
Based upon this information, the Deputy Sheriff went to Singer's home to
arrest him. Id.
434 Id.
15 Id. The court noted that "a transcript of the November 19 status
hearing
reflects that the judge dismissed the charges in 'the interests of justice,'
because the prosecution was unable to locate its primary witness... and
therefore could not assure the court the case could be tried on the scheduled
date." Id.
421
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pursuant to Section 1983 and a malicious prosecution claim under
state law. 43
The court began its analysis by setting forth the principle that
once an individual presents a Section 1983 claim for malicious
prosecution, the court must employ a two step inquiry.'
First,
the court must determine "whether the defendant's conduct was
tortious." 4
Second, the court must determine "whether the
plaintiff's injuries were caused by the deprivation of liberty
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment." 49 Discussing the second
inquiry first, the court stated that "[tihe Fourth Amendment right
implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free
of unreasonable seizure of the person - i.e., the right to be free
of unreasonable or unwarranted restraints on personal liberty.'O
Therefore, an individual asserting a malicious prosecution claim
under Section 1983, must "show some deprivation of liberty
consistent with the concept of 'seizure.'""
Moreover, the2
process."'"
legal
to
'pursuant
effected
been
have
"must
seizure
This "legal process" is often in the form of an arrest warrant or a
subsequent arraignment." 3
The court concluded that Singer's arrest was not "pursuant to
legal process" and could not serve as the "predicate deprivation
of liberty" because his arrest was made without a warrant and it
occurred before an arraignment.'
The court assumed arguendo
that Singer's release after his arraignment could have constituted
a "seizure.""'
The court noted that nothing in the record
indicated any "deprivation of liberty," such as the requirement to
4'6 Id. at 113-14.
37Id.

at 116.

. Id.
39

Id.

" Id.
441Id.

Id. at 116-17 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994)).
' Id. at 117.
"Therefore, to successfully pursue a § 1983 claim of

"2

malicious prosecution in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, Singer
must show some post-arraignment deprivation of liberty that rises to the level
of a constitutional violation." Id.
4"Id.

45id.
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post bail or an inability to travel freely." 6 The court rejected
Singer's claim because he failed to establish one of the state tort

elements of malicious prosecution." 7 Specifically, the court
found that the dismissal of the charges against Singer by the State
Court "in the interests of justice" was not favorable to support
Singer's malicious prosecution claim. 44

In Lennon v. Miller,449 a case addressing false arrest, malicious
prosecution and excessive force, the Second Circuit held that
police officers were entitled to qualified immunity on all of the
three claims.450 Mr. Lennon, whose prior threats to his wife,
Mrs. Lennon ["plaintiff"], had been reported by her to the

police, sought to obtain possession of a car from her.451 Plaintiff
called the police who determined that Mr. Lennon had a right to

take possession of the ca45 Police officers asked plaintiff to get
out of the car in which she was sitting. 411 Plaintiff refused and in
order to place her under arrest for "obstructing governmental
administration," the defendants forcibly removed her from the
vehicle. 454 After the charges against her were dropped,455 plaintiff

446

id.

47Id.
at 118. The court stated that "[a]t common law, 'an accused, in order
to maintain a cause of action for malicious prosecution, must establish that the
state prosecution terminated in his favor.'" Id. (citing Singleton v. City of
New York, 632 F.2d 285, 193 (2d Cir. 1980)).
' Id. "'[A]s a matter of law, [a dismissal in the interests of justice] cannot
provide the favorable termination required as the basis for a claim of malicious
prosecution.'" Id. (citing Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 368 (2d Cir. 1992).
44' 66 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 2995).
4
10 Id. at 426.
451Id. at 419. Mr. and Mrs. Lennon were having marital problems and were
living
separately at the time of this dispute. Id. at 418-19.
452
Id. at 419.

453Id.
454id.

455

Id. at 420. The Criminal Court dismissed the charges stating:
If the officer believed that the defendant's possession of the vehicle
was wrongful he should have arrested the defendant for
Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle or Larceny of the Vehicle ....
Since the officer did not arrest the defendant for any crime in
connection with her possession of the vehicle, the officer had no
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brought this action against the police officers under Section
1983.456

The District Court denied defendants' motion for

summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. 4" The Court
of Appeals reversed, finding the officers entitled to qualified

immunity on the claims.4"'
Just one month later, in Russell v. Smith,459 the Second Circuit
addressed another malicious prosecution case. Once again, the
court adhered to its belief that malicious prosecution claims
asserted under Section 1983 are governed by state law.' Russell
involved a plaintiff who had been charged with a second-degree
murder.46' Following the dismissal of the indictment "with leave

authority to remove the defendant from the vehicle and the charge of
Obstructing Governmental Administration cannot stand.
Id. at 419.
' Plaintiff argued that she was arrested and charged with a crime without
probable cause, in violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
It should be noted that although plaintiff referred to her claim as a violation of
her Fourteenth Amendment rights, her complaint also identified the Fourth
Amendment as a source of her claims. Id. at 423 n.2. Therefore, relying on
Albright, the court construed plaintiff's allegation, that she was arrested
without probable cause, as Fourth Amendment claims. Id.
4Id.
at 420.
' Id at 426. When addressing the test for qualified immunity, the court
made two observations. Id. at 422-23. First, "the availability of qualified
immunity does not turn on whether the defendants violated the plaintiff's
rights; qualified immunity is a defense." Id. at 423. Second, the "objective
standard" does not demand the presence of clearly established constitutional
rights, but an objectively reasonable belief by the defendants that their actions
did not violate that right. Id. Applying these principles to the case, the court
found that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to conclude that they
had probable cause to believe that plaintiff obstructed governmental
administration. Id.at 425. The court applied the identical standard for
qualified immunity under malicious prosecution claims as it did under the false
arrest claim. Id. at 425. "That is, was it objectively reasonable for the
officers to believe that probable cause existed or could officers of reasonable
competence disagree on whether the probable cause test was met." Id.
(quoting Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991)).
49 68 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1995).
4'Id. at 36.
4" Id. at 34 .
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to re-present, " 4 plaintiff commenced a malicious prosecution
claim under Section 1983 against the police officers and the City
of New

York. 463

Without referring to Albright, the court looked

at the common law elements of malicious prosecution when
considering plaintiff's claim.46" The court concluded that plaintiff
had failed to establish one of the elements of the common law
tort, specifically, that the prior proceeding was terminated in

plaintiff's favor. 465 Dismissal of the indictment with leave to represent was not considered a favorable termination. 66

The Second Circuit expanded the principles set forth in Albright
in Murphy v. Lynn.467 In Murphy, the court expanded the concept
of a deprivation of liberty that is required for purposes of a

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.468 Relying on
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Albright, the court held that

restrictions imposed on an accused's ability to travel outside the
state, together with required court appearances, constituted a
seizure within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.469 Plaintiff,

Ernesto Murphy, was arrested and charged with disorderly
conduct, resisting arrest, and felony assault arising from a traffic
stop.47' After his arraignment, Murphy was released on his own
recognizance with a condition that he remain in the state while the
charges against him were pending and return to court when
462

Id.

Prior to his trial, the witness who had implicated plaintiff in the

homicides recanted his testimony. Id. Accordingly, the state court dismissed
the indictment "with leave to re-present." Id.
463id.

4Id. at36.

Id. at 37. The court reasoned that because the state court dismissed the
indictment against plaintiff "with leave to re-present," the state still had the
ability to reinstate the murder charges against plaintiff. Id.
4" Id. at 36. The court recognized that when a criminal proceeding is not
terminated in such a manner that establishes either innocence or guilt, the
"plaintiff must show that the final disposition is indicative of innocence." Id.
Nevertheless, plaintiff was unable to prove that the "dismissal was indicative
of innocence, or that the prosecution was subsequently abandoned." Id. at 37.
47 118 F.3d 938 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1051 (1998).
46 Id. at 944.
9Id. at 946.
40 Id.at 941-42.
4
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Subsequently, the indictment was dismissed

due to a violation of Murphy's right to a speedy trial.1 Plaintiff

commenced a Section 1983 action for false arrest, use of
excessive force, and malicious prosecution in violation of his
First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. 4'

Murphy appealed the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim
and the Second Circuit reversed and remanded. 4

Following a

trial, a verdict was returned in plaintiff's favor. 4'
The
defendants appealed, arguing that the conditions imposed on
plaintiff did not "implicate rights under the Fourth
Amendment."476 Furthermore, the defendants maintained that the
dismissal based upon a violation of speedy trial, did not constitute
a "termination of the criminal proceeding in favor of the
accused."4"7

471Id. at 942.
42Id. at

943.

Id. Plaintiff commenced the action against two police officers, the police
department, the police chief and the Town of Clarkstown. Id
' Id. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims as barred by the statute
of limitations. Id. Thereafter, the Second Department reversed the dismissal
of the malicious prosecution claim noting that the statue of limitations "had not
accrued until the criminal charges against Murphy were dismissed in
December, 1990 and hence were asserted within the three-year period." Id.
See also Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 118 S.
'

Ct. 1051 (1998).
47 Murphy, 118 F.3d at 943. The claims against the Town, the police
department, and the police chief were dismissed. Id. However, the claims
against the police officers were presented to the jury. Id. The jury
instructions were as follows:
In order to succeed on a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983,
Murphy was required to prove (1) '[t]he commencement or the
continuance of a criminal proceeding by a defendant against the
plaintiff,' (2) 'the termination of that proceeding in favor of the
plaintiff,' (3) 'the absence of probable cause for the proceeding,' (4)
'actual malice on the part of the person acting,' and (5) 'a postarraignment deprivation of liberty guaranteed by the constitution.'
Id.47
6 Id.at 944.
m Id.
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The Second Circuit rejected the defendants' argument and
affirmed. 478

Noting that liberty deprivations regulated by the

Fourth Amendment are not limited to "physical detention," the
court held that a restriction on out-of-state travel imposed as a
condition for release and an obligation to appear in court,
constitute Fourth Amendment "seizure. "471 The court reasoned:
while a state has the undoubted authority in connection
with a criminal proceeding, to restrict a properly accused
citizen's constitutional right to travel outside of the state
as a condition of his pretrial release, and may order him
to make periodic appearances, such conditions are
appropriately viewed as seizures within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.480
The condition imposed upon Murphy was "an obvious
curtailment of his otherwise unquestionable constitutional right to
481
travel outside the state.
In Robinson v. CattaraugusCounty,482 the Second Circuit again
addressed a malicious prosecution claim.
Following an
undercover investigation, plaintiffs Robinson and Shine were
charged with possession and sale of cocaine. 483 Robinson pleaded
guilty and served a two-year prison term as a result of his guilty
plea.48 4 Following a bench trial, Shine was found guilty. 485 The
Appellate Division reversed Shine's conviction finding "sheer
lawlessness", "egregious misconduct" and "conduct repugnant to

m Id.
479Id. at 946.
4W Id.

4" Id. Additionally, the court noted that during the year in which the charges
were pending Murphy was required to appear in court eight times. Id.
Therefore, the court rejected the defendant's argument concluding that "the
restrictions imposed upon Murphy constituted a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment." Id.
4s2147 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
' Id. at 157.
44Id.

4'-s/d. at 158.
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a sense of justice" on the part of the two arresting officers. 8 6
The court reasoned that the police officer's "violent and
intimidating conduct" of "demanding entry to a person's home in
the middle of the night, displaying a gun and demanding drugs,"
deprived plaintiff of due process. 7
Following the reversal, Robinson and Shine filed a Section
1983 action and alleged Fourth Amendment violations;
additionally, Shine alleged malicious prosecution.'
At trial, the
jury determined that Robinson and Shine's constitutional rights
were violated and that the defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity.4 9 However, the court awarded low damages
to Shine and no damages to Robinson. Moreover, the jury
rejected Shine's malicious prosecution claim. 41' A motion for a
new trial was denied.49 '

On appeal, plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the jury
findings were "against the weight of the evidence, "M9 and that the
4

s6

Id. As part of an undercover operation, two police officers frequented a

pub located in Cattaraugus County in an effort to find narcotics dealers. Id. at
156. Every week for several months, the officers would ask Robinson, one of
three black residents, for drugs. Id. On every occasion he responded that he
had no drugs and knew of no source. Id. Believing that he was being
harassed because he was black, Robinson decided to sell the officers a bag
filed with sugar for $200.00. Id. at 157. Several weeks later, the officers
went to the pub and got Robinson's address from one of the pub patrons. Id.
The officers represented themselves as car thieves and told the patron that
Robinson had "ripped them off and they were going to teach that nigger a
lesson." Id. That night, the officers entered Robinson's home, held Robinson
and Shine at gunpoint, searched the occupants and took two bags of cocaine
and $75.00 from Shine's pocket. Id.
' Id. "Defendant did not seek out the officers to sell drugs to them and the
meager evidence that defendant may have been involved in the prior sale to the
officers of powdered sugar rather than cocaine hardly supports a finding of
'ongoing criminal activity.'" Id. (citing People v. Shine, 187 A.D.2d 950,
951, 590 N.Y.S.2d 965, 965-66 (4th Dep't. 1992)).
' Id. at 159. Shine died before the trial. Id.
4SId.
4

10

Id.

49' Id. at 158.
492 Id. at 159. Plaintiffs argue that they were entitled to a new trial on the
issue of damages because the evidence proved that they were detained and
terrorized in the house and they should have been compensated for pain and
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supplemental instructions to the jury were improper."'

On the

malicious prosecution claim, Shine contended that the jury was
improperly instructed that the grand jury indictment of Shine
"constituted probable cause," and that the text of the decision of
the Appellate Division should have been introduced into
evidence.4 94 Without citing or addressing Aibright, the Second
Circuit affirmed, finding "no basis for reversal."495 The court
stated that:

[i]n order to prevail on a claim
prosecution, a plaintiff must show
defendant initiated or caused the
proceedings against the plaintiff without

for malicious
that the civil
institution of
probable cause,

that the proceedings were commenced against him with

malice on the part of the civil defendant, and that those
proceedings terminated in the plaintiff's favor.496
The court found with regard to the first element, that the jury was

instructed that the grand jury indictment was "evidence of
probable cause," rebuttable by proof that the police officers
suffering. As they did not receive sufficient damages, they argued that the
jury acted improperly "against the weight of the evidence." Id. The court
rejected this argument reasoning that the denial of a new trial by the District
Court "on the ground that the jury verdict was against the weight of the
evidence is not reviewable on appeal." Id. at 160.
49 Id. at 159. Plaintiffs' contended that the original jury instructions failed
to indicate that punitive damages were proper even without compensatory
damages. Id. at 161. The court found that the instructions contained plain
error by failing to instruct the jury that if a constitutional violation was found
the jury "must award at least nominal damages." Id. at 162. However, the
plain error was cured because the court entered judgment awarding the
plaintiffs each $1.00 as nominal damages. Id. Additionally, plaintiffs argued
that the supplemental instructions dissuaded jurors from awarding punitive
damages. Id. at 161. The court rejected this argument finding that there was
no indication that the court "conveyed a suggestion that the jury should not
award punitive damages." Id. at 161-62.
49 4
Id. at 159.
495
Id. at 160.
496Id. at 163 (citing Russel v. Smith, 68 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1995); Broughton
v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 335 N.E.2d 310, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975)).
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misrepresented, concealed or falsified evidence.4 ' There was no
evidence that the jury was told that the indictment created a
"conclusive presumption of probable cause." 4 With regard to
the introduction of the Appellate Division opinion into evidence,
the court noted that even if it would have been appropriate to give
the jury the opinion, the opinion did not address whether probable
cause existed to indict.4 The court noted that the Appellate
Division relied upon due process in reversing the conviction, not
the absence of probable cause.500
VI. THE PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF ALBRIGHT

Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court, approaches by
the lower courts to malicious prosecution under Section 1983
have been inconsistent. What we see as a result of Albright is
that some lower courts are attempting to interpret Albright, while
others are totally avoiding confronting it501 and even ignoring it."~
However, given the diversity of opinions in AIbright, it is no
wonder that the lower courts have been struggling with Albright.
It is not easy to analyze the decisions in Albright. In fact, the
"splintered decision" indicates that the Justices themselves were
in disagreement on how substantive due process claims should be
addressed. It appears that the "embarrassing diversity of judicial
opinion" that Chief Justice Rehnquist had attempted to combat
continues, notwithstanding the Court's ineffectual attempt to end
the conflict.
It is clear that the Court in Albright attempted to limit the scope
of substantive due process. 0 3 But, in so doing, has the Court
employed any convenient means to accomplish this goal?
Apparently, the Court has employed an indirect means to
497 Id.

499
Id. at 163.
4

Id. at 163-64 (citing United States v. McCormack, 829 F.2d 322 (2d Cir.
1987)).
9

5W

Id.

50'

See, e.g., Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139 (2d Cir. 1995).
See, e.g., Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1994).
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994).

"02
-
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accomplish its objective by both ignoring precedent and
misinterpreting precedent. 5 4 As a consequence, the lower courts
continue to struggle with this issue and conflicting decisions

within the many circuits continue to arise.
Prior to Albright, some lower courts- recognized a Section 1983
claim for malicious prosecution claim under the doctrine of
substantive due process. 5 5 Then along came Albright, which held
that substantive due process is not the proper method for

evaluating claims of prosecution without probable cause. 5 6
Instead, the analysis shifted to the Fourth Amendment with its
own undefined parameters. 0 7

Had the plurality addressed the

claim under the Fourth Amendment, perhaps the lower courts
would have some guidance."' However, since Albright did not
argue a Fourth Amendment violation in his Section 1983 claim,

0 See Albright, 510 U.S. at 305 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent,
Justice Stevens argued that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia read the
Court's opinion in Grahamv. Connor "more broadly than our actual holding."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, Justice Souter's
reliance on Collins v. Harker Heights was improper. Id. at 310 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens also criticized Justice Kennedy's reliance on
Parratt v. Taylor as unfounded, noting that "the Parrat doctrine is also
inapplicable here because it does not apply to cases in which the constitutional
deprivation is complete when the tort occurs." Id. at 314 n. 34 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See also Albright, 510 U.S. at 286-87 (Souter, J., concurring). In
his opinion:
The Court has previously rejected the proposition that the
Constitution's application to a general subject (like prosecution) is
necessarily exhausted by protection under particular textual
guarantees addressing specific events within that subject (like search
and seizure), on a theory that one specific constitutional provision
can pre-empt a broad field as against another more general one.
Id. at 286 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Property, 50 U.S. 43 (1993)). According to Justice Souter, precedent
requires the Court to "examine each constitutional provision in turn." Id. at
287 (Souter, J., concurring).
505See supra text accompanying notes 148-200.
0 Albright, 510 U.S. at 273-74.
4 Id. at 274.
" Id. at 275.
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the Albright court did not address such a claim under the Fourth
Amendment.5 0 9 Thus the Court left the cause of action unclear.
The plurality did appear to agree on one concept, that
substantive due process is not available to an individual where a
specific constitutional amendment provides a remedy for a
violation."' 0 This central theme rests on the Court's prior
decisions in Graham v. Connor5, and Collins v. City of Harker
Heights.5 "2 The Court relied upon Collins for its holding that
"'the Court has been reluctant to expand the concept of
substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and openended.' "5 The Court also looked to Graham, for its proposition
that "[wjhere a particular Amendment 'provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular
sort of behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized
notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for
5 14
analyzing these claims."
The Aibright Court relied on Graham to ensure that substantive
due process is reserved for protecting rights "relating to
marriage, family procreation, and the right to bodily integrity,"515
and on Collins to avoid substantive due process as much as
possible."1 6 Accordingly, the Court was able to dispose of
Albright's substantive due process claim because his alleged
violation was not within those categories and because the
guideposts in the "uncharted area" of substantive due process are
"scarce and open-ended." 51

' Id. "We express no view as to whether petitioner's claim would succeed
under the Fourth Amendment, since he has not presented that question in his
petition for certiorari." Id.
510
id. at 273.

490 U.S. 386 (1989).
U.S. 115 (1992).
Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 (citing Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
514
1d. at 273 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 395).
511

512 503
5 13

515
5 16

Id. at 272.
Id.

517Id. at

271-74.
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Can we really fault the court for its reluctance to expand

substantive due process? Hasn't the Court been highly criticized
with every attempt it has made to expand the doctrine?"'8 On the

other hand, hasn't the court on many occasions ventured into
"uncharted areas"?19
So where does that leave the Supreme Court's decision in

Albright today?
directions.

The Justices in Albright lead us in different

Under Justice Kennedy's expanded interpretation of

Parratt v. Taylor, some lower courts believe that whenever an
adequate state remedy exists, the federal Section 1983 claim must
be denied. However, Justice Kennedy's interpretation of Parratt

is misplaced because Parrattand Albright involve totally different
types of due process claims. According to Professor Martin
Schwartz, Justice Kennedy misread Parrattbecause the Parratt

Doctrine "encompasses a narrow range of procedural due process
claims -

specifically,

those arising

out of random

and

unauthorized official conduct.""' Extending Parrattto alleged
violations of substantive constitutional rights would place in
jeopardy the Supreme Court's ruling in Monroe v. Pape,"' that a
federal remedy for a Section 1983 claim exists notwithstanding
any available state remedies.522

511See Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Tons, and Due
Process of Law, 72 CHI-KENT L. REv. 617, 637 (1997) (stating that the

doctrine of substantive due process has "gotten the Court into more trouble
than any other for over a century, from Scott v. Sandford, to Lochner v. New
York, through the Court's retreat from Lochner in the 1930's, and on to Roe v.
Wade and the controversy that continues to rage over that case."). See also
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5'9 See Wells, supra note 518, at 643. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386 (1989).
520 1A, MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 3.20 at 319-21 (3ed. 1997). See also
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
521 65 U.S. 167 (1961).
522 See id. See also Treece v. City of Naperville, No. 94 C 5548, 1998 WL
142391, at *5 (N.D.IlI. March 25, 1998) (rejecting defendant's argument that
adequate state remedies exist for a malicious prosecution claim).
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Justice Stevens would have extended relief to Albright under a
substantive due process violation analysis.
Justice Stevens
believed that the filing of baseless criminal charges is violative of
substantive due process because it is a deprivation of liberty.
Justice Souter left open the possibility that substantive due
process may be available under different circumstances.
However, according to Justice Souter, there is no need to expand
substantive due process if doing so would duplicate specific
constitutional protections already provided. Finally, some courts
find persuasive Justice Ginsburg's "continuing seizure" theory."
Was the flaw in Aibrigh its holding or the method by which the
holding was reasoned? Some writers believe that Aibright was

decided correctly, but opine that the disturbing nature of Aibright
2 4 One writer,
lies in the Court's strained reading of Graham."
James Lank, argues that the plurality's interpretation of Graham
"may emerge as a powerful tool in disposing of future substantive

due process claims. "'s

According to Lank:

[t]he court has fashioned a powerful tool that can be used
to avoid considering substantive due process claims, but
has done so at the expense of judicial credibility, in
relying upon a strained reading of Graham. If
substantive due process is to be limited, the best means
short of disavowing it entirely may be to adopt Justice
Scalia's explicit and categorical restriction of the
5' See, e.g., Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938 (2d Cir. 1997) (relying on
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Albright to hold that restrictions on
the ability of a defendant to travel together with the requirement that he attend
court appointments constituted a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment); Beberaggi v. New York City Transit Authority, No. 93 Civ.
1737, 1994 WL 75144, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. March 9, 1994) (relying on Justice
Ginsburg's opinion in Albright); Cyprus v. Diskin, 936 F. Supp 259, 263 n.3
(E.D.Pa 1996) (noting Justice Ginsburg's "persuasive observations" in
Albright); but see Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting Justice Ginsburg's "continuing seizure" theory).
' James Lank, The GrahamDoctrine as a Weapon against Substantive Due
Process: Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807(1994), 17 HARv. J.L & PUB.
POL'Y, 918, 925 (1994).
5
2' Id. at 929.
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doctrine, under which no new due process rights, which
would impose further restriction on the States' criminal
processes, may be asserted. Although this approach
does not mesh with all of the Court's due process
jurisprudence, it has the virtue of being straightforward
526
and final.
Others believe that Albright was decided incorrectly.527 They
believe that constitutional torts are "built around substantive due
process."'5 2 According to Michael Wells, "Albright... seems to
be a product of the Court's preference for the 'specifics' of the
Bill of Rights." 5 29 Wells believes that "[i]f the Court meant that
one may sue only for an illegal arrest, then the effect of its ruling
is to deny constitutional protection to the interest in being free of
5 30
badly motivated prosecutions in the absence of incarceration."
In his opinion:
the central aim of constitutional tort should be to protect
the broad range of common law interests encompassed
within the Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty,'
in
circumstances where the official's conduct is fairly
characterized as an abuse of power. The appropriate
doctrinal category is substantive due process, however
uncomfortable the Court may be with that doctrine. The
Court ought either cast its lot with the critics of
substantive due process, or else face them down. If the
Justices believe that they may not make the law, then
constitutional tort doctrine must be jettisoned in any
event, along with a wide range of other constitutional
doctrines. But, if they think, as their holding seems to
indicate, that creative judicial rule making is sometimes
appropriate and that tort law is an area meeting the
52

Id.
52 See Wells, supranote 518, at 637.
52'
Id. at 639.
529id.
'0

Id. at 648-49.
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criteria for judicial invention, then the proper course is
to say so, and to offer real justifications rather than the
false ones found in many of the opinions.
The
legitimacy of judicial law making turns not on whether
the Court can avoid references to substantive due process
as much as possible, but on whether it can offer
persuasive reasons 1grounded in constitutional values for
53
its creative work.
Albright offers little direction and no clear guidance in
resolving the question of whether malicious prosecution is
actionable under Section 1983. Had Albright interposed a clear
Fourth Amendment claim among his Section 1983 claims for
malicious prosecution, the state of jurisprudence might not be so
confused.
The Justices' pronouncements on this issue,
specifically with regard to the interplay of the Fourth Amendment
and Section 1983 in a malicious prosecution claim, has left the
lower courts with no clear legal principles to apply to new fact
patterns.
This author believes that in order to prevail on a Section 1983
claim for malicious prosecution, a practitioner should couch the
claim solely as a Fourth Amendment violation without labeling
the claim as one for "malicious prosecution." This strategy may
afford a plaintiff the greatest likelihood of success since the label
"malicious prosecution" does not add anything to the claim.
Since under Section 1983 a plaintiff must ultimately prove a
constitutional violation, it should not matter what label the
plaintiff uses.
The practitioner will also be faced with the issue of whether
substantive due process has any role in this context after Albright.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has clearly disfavored the
doctrine of substantive due process,
The Court has expressed
its reluctance to expand substantive due process because the
531

Id. at 660.

See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 91997); Albright
v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1993); Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115
(1992).
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guidelines for "responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered
area are scarce and open-ended. "533

A plaintiff who asserts a Fourth Amendment violation together
with a substantive due process claim, is not likely to succeed on
the substantive due process claim because Albright rejects the

extension of substantive due process to malicious prosecution. 34
If, however, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated, then
substantive due process may be available to the plaintiff.

For example, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,535 a high speed
pursuit case, the United States Supreme Court stated that
substantive due process is unavailable where a claim is "covered
by" the Fourth Amendment.536 However, the Lewis Court found
537
that because there was no Fourth Amendment seizure,
substantive due process could be asserted by the Section 1983
plaintiff. Applying the "shock the conscience" standard,5 3 the
Court concluded that no constitutional liability for high-speed
chases arises unless the officer has acted with the intent to harm
539
the suspect or to worsen a suspect's legal plight.

133 Collins, 503 U.S. at 125. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
5' See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994).
515 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998). In Lewis, parents sued under Section 1983 to
recover for deprivation of their son's substantive due process right to life after
he was killed as a result of a high-speed police chase. Id. at 1712.
536 Id. at 1715.
537 Id. at 1715-16. "A police pursuit in attempting to seize a person does not
amount to a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
1715 (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)). See also Brower
v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
31 Id. at 1718. "[C]onduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by
any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the
conscience-shocking level." Id. See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952) (holding that the forceful pumping of a criminal suspect's stomach
violated substantive due process because the government's conduct "shocked
the conscience"); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). "So-called
'substantive due process' prevents the government from engaging in conduct
that 'shocks the conscience,'

. . .

or interferes with rights 'implicit in the

concept of ordered liberty.'" Id. at 746 (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172).
9Id. at 1720-21.
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The significance of Lewis "extends far beyond pursuit cases.""
The decision demonstrates that different types of substantive due
process claims require different modes of analysis. 1 The criteria
for identifying "fatally arbitrary" action depends on whether
legislative or executive action is at issue- 4Z Substantive due
process challenges to different types of executive action, for
example, call for different "shock the conscience" evaluations. 43
Therefore, plaintiffs asserting substantive due process claims
must now consider whether the challenge is to executive or
legislative action.
Given the Supreme Court's expressed reluctance to expand
substantive due process, the critical question is whether the
plaintiff can prove a violation of Fourth Amendment rights. This
in turn requires the Supreme Court to resolve what types of post
indictment restraints against liberty constitute Fourth Amendment
seizure.
If a pure Fourth Amendment claim is the best alternative in a
malicious prosecution claim shouldn't the state law claim be
sufficient? Even when state remedies are available, Section 1983
is usually the better alternative. As Justice Harlan stated: "a
deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different and
more serious than a violation of a state right and therefore
deserves a different remedy even though the same act may
constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional
right. "5' In addition, unlike a plaintiff in a state court claim, the
availability of attorneys fees under Section 1988 makes the
Section 1983 claim more desirable.
5 Martin Schwartz, The Decision On Police Pursuit, N.Y.L.J. Oct. 20,
1998, at 3.
541 Id.
'42 Id. See also Lewis, 118 S.
54 See Lewis, 118 S. Ct.

Ct. at 1716.
at 1717-18.
"Deliberate indifference is an
appropriate measure of whether official conduct is conscience shocking when,
but only when, actual deliberation by an official is practical." Schwartz, supra
note 540, at 3. On the other hand, where an official does not have an
opportunity to deliberate and make a quick decision, it is not appropriate to
apply the deliberate indifference standard. Id.
5"
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION

The long debate over whether malicious prosecution gives rise
to a constitutional claim will continue until the Supreme Court
addresses the issue again and resolves the many unsettled
questions. Among the issues to be resolved, whether malicious
prosecution is actionable under the Fourth Amendment, whether
the availability of a state tort remedy should foreclose the use of
Section 1983 in federal court, and whether substantive due
process is available at all.
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